Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements by Josh Lerner & Ulrike Malmendier
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We would like to thank Philippe Aghion, Pablo Casas-Arce, Susan Athey, George Baker, Pierre-André
Chiappori, Thomas Hellmann, Rebecca Henderson, Robert Merges, David Robinson, Patrick Schmitz, Halla
Yang, and Jeff Zwiebel, as well as workshop participants at the AFA Meeting 2005, Columbia University,
Harvard University, MIT, the NBER Organizational Economics Meeting, Simon Fraser University, and
Stanford University for helpful comments. We especially thank Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole for their detailed
suggestions. We also benefited from conversations with a number of practitioners, especially Prem Das and
Michael Lytton. Nageeb Ali, Burak Guner, Camelia Kuhnen, Charmaine Lee, Han Lee, Felix Momsen, and
Chenling Zhang provided excellent research assistance. Harvard Business School’s Division of Research
provided financial support. All errors are our own.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2005 by Josh Lerner and Ulrike Malmendier.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.  Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements
Josh Lerner and Ulrike Malmendier
NBER Working Paper No. 11292
April 2005
JEL No. D23, L14, L24, O31, O32, O34
ABSTRACT
We analyze how variations in contractibility affect the  design  of  contracts in the context of
biotechnology research agreements. A major concern of firms financing biotechnology research is
that the R&D firms might use the funding to subsidize other projects or substitute one project for
another. We develop a model based on the property-rights theory of the firm that allows for
researchers in the R&D firms to pursue multiple projects. When research activities are non-
verifiable, we show that it is optimal for the financing company to obtain the option right to
terminate the research agreement while maintaining broad property rights to the terminated project.
The option right induces the biotechnology firm researchers not to deviate from the proposed
research  activities.  The  contract  prevents  opportunistic  exercise  of  the  termination  right  by
conditioning payments on the termination of the agreement. We test the model empirically using a
new data set on 584 biotechnology research agreements. We find that the assignment of termination
and  broad  intellectual  property  rights  to  the  financing  firm  occurs  in  contractually  difficult
environments in which there is no specifiable lead product candidate. We also analyze how the
contractual design varies with the R&D firm's financial constraints and research capacities and with
the type of financing firm. The additional empirical results allow us to distinguish the property-rights
explanation from alternative stories, based on uncertainty and asymmetric information about the
project quality or research abilities.
Josh Lerner
Harvard Business School











                                                
I. Introduction 
Understanding the determinants and limits of contract design is central to numerous fields of 
economic analysis, including organizational economics, labor economics, and corporate finance. 
An important distinction, introduced by the literature on incomplete contracts, is the observability 
and verifiability of actions and outputs on which the parties would like to contract (cf. Hart 
(1995)). If key variables are not verifiable in front of judges, the contracting parties have to find 
alternative mechanisms to induce the expected behavior, such as (re-) allocating asset ownership. 
This paper analyzes how the design of contracts varies as underlying variables become 
harder or easier to pin down. We compare, both theoretically and empirically, how the decision 
rights of one party depend on the contractibility of the effort to be performed by the other party. 
The empirical context is the U.S. biotechnology industry. Innovative activities in the 
biotechnology sector frequently take the form of research agreements between biotechnology 
companies (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing 
companies”). The research tasks to be performed by the biotechnology company can sometimes 
be specified in the contract, especially if the parties have a predetermined lead product candidate 
and the biotechnology researchers simply have to perform a series of specifiable experiments. 
Oftentimes, however, no such lead product candidate exists and it is hard to write a contract on 
what the researchers should be working on. In this paper, we analyze how the contract design 
covaries with such contracting difficulties.  
The analysis of “real-world contract design” in light of the theoretical work on contracts 
has advanced rapidly in the field of complete contracts. A considerable number of papers identify 
and test the implications of asymmetric information and moral hazard.
1 Empirical research 
relating to incomplete contracts has been much sparser. This may reflect empirical difficulties in 
pinning down theoretical concepts such as observability, verifiability and even incompleteness. 
Two leading exceptions are the work by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003 and 2004), which provides 
evidence on the empirical incompleteness of contracts, and the work by Baker and Hubbard 
(2003 and 2004), which confirms the role of asset ownership to deal with limits to contracting. 
The former research gets around the empirical problem of translating abstract theory into tangible 
empirics by providing an exhaustive description of all contractual elements. The latter research 
benefits from a switch in the monitoring technology of truck drivers, which allows for contracts 
previously not feasible. The approach taken in this paper resembles most closely the latter. We 
identify an empirical proxy for contractibility and relate it to variations in contract design. A 
large, hand-collected data set on research agreements allows us to address empirically a number 
 
1 See the survey by Chiappori and Salanie (2003).   2
of concerns plaguing that literature, such as unobserved firm characteristics (via firm fixed-
effects and firm-level controls), and to test directly competing explanations. 
Contracting difficulties are a key concern in biotechnology research agreements since the 
financing company and research firm pursue different goals. While it is the objective of the 
financing company to develop a certain viable and profitable drug, the researchers of the R&D 
firm are also interested in advancing research projects underway in other research agreements or 
stand-alone projects. Moreover, the researchers are typically more academically oriented and may 
focus on different types of research even within the collaboration project. The risk for the 
financing company is that the biotechnology researchers take the money provided for the 
collaboration but devote their energies to other projects. This is in fact a major concern of 
pharmaceutical companies entering research agreements and has been termed “project 
substitution” or “project cross-subsidization.” 
We explore how the collaborating firms address this incentive conflict contractually. 
Empirically, we find that when a research partnership is initiated without any specifiable lead 
product candidate and it is thus not possible to contract on the exact nature of the research 
activities, the contracting parties endogenously generate decision rights to govern the 
relationship. These decision rights typically give the financing company the unilateral and 
unconditional right to terminate the research agreement while obtaining broadened access to the 
intellectual property rights. In fact, pharmaceutical firms often assert that the only remedy to the 
lack of contractibility is to have the right to terminate the research collaboration. No matter how 
carefully designed the contract, they argue, constructing a transaction that forestalls all 
contingencies is impossible. As a result, firms pay an enormous amount of attention to 
negotiating termination rights. These terms have been described as “probably the most heavily 
negotiated (at least in terms of time) provision” in biotechnology research agreements (Somers 
(2003)). Moreover, these contracts often specify that, in case of termination, the financing firm 
will maintain extensive access to the intellectual property of the prior research. The rights 
accruing to the financing firm in case of termination are broader than in case of continuation and 
go beyond the specific application targeted by the original research collaboration. 
We provide a theoretical explanation of the observed contract design, based on the 
property-rights theory of the firm, in particular Hart and Moore (1988) and Nöldeke and Schmidt 
(1995). Our model allows for multi-tasking of researchers in the R&D firm in the sense of 
Holmström and Milgrom (1991). We derive the option to terminate while obtaining broad rights 
to the terminated project as an endogenously generated decision right that allows the financing 
company to act upon an observable but not verifiable variable, namely the success of the (joint) 
research and expected marketability of the product. The optimal contract specifies different 
payments in case of termination and in case of continuation to ensure that the financing company   3
terminates if and only if the R&D firm diverts effort from the collaboration into other projects. It 
also specifies that, in case of termination, the financing firm will obtain the broadest access to the 
intellectual property of the research collaboration.  
This allocation of property rights is profit maximizing for the financing company if the 
R&D company is financially constrained. Assigning broad property rights to the financing 
company – beyond the originally targeted research object – is likely to induce some loss of 
surplus. After all, it is exactly this type of broader research the financing company would like to 
prevent the R&D company from undertaking. The rationale, then, for such an inefficient 
assignment of intellectual property rights lies in the need to generate the right incentives for the 
research company. Since the R&D firm has no or little liquidity, it cannot compensate the 
financing company for continuation payments ex ante or commit to “negative payments” in case 
of termination. Reducing the R&D company’s property rights in case of termination minimizes 
the financing company’s required payment in case of continuation for a given (optimal) payoff 
difference between continuation and termination for the R&D company.  
The financial constraints of the R&D company make option contracts costly for the 
financing company. The pharmaceutical company will typically extract less profit than in a 
complete-contracts world, in which it can contract directly on the type of research activity. 
Therefore, whenever it is possible to contract on details of the research to be undertaken by the 
R&D company, the financing company will rather employ such a complete contract in lieu of 
termination rights. When contracting on research is not possible, the financing company may 
instead employ the option contract. 
By the same logic, our model also implies that an option contract is particularly likely if 
the outside options of the financing company are high. For example, the financing company can 
credibly threaten to terminate the agreement if it profits sufficiently from the broader rights it 
obtains in case of termination, even without the continued collaboration of the R&D company. To 
prevent the financing company from exercising the termination option and using the intellectual 
property in collaboration with other firms and researchers, the R&D firm will be willing to focus 
on the collaboration project even if continuation payments are not too high. The model thus 
predicts that, the greater are the financing firm’s outside options, (a) the stronger should be the 
correlation between option-contract design and non-contractibility and (b) under non-
contractibility, the more common should be the option contract. 
Similarly, if the biotechnology firm is less financially constrained, the option contract 
may be less costly, since the R&D company could commit to payments in case of termination. On 
the other hand, a liquid R&D company could also assume the role of the residual claimant, 
rendering the option contract unnecessary. Thus, while our model does not have specific 
predictions about contract design in research agreements with liquid biotechnology firms, the   4
option-contracts design should be most strongly correlated with the lack of contractibility in 
research agreements with financially constrained R&D firms. 
The predictions of this incomplete-contracts interpretation of the observed contract 
design are borne out in the empirical analysis. Research agreements employ the termination 
clause (with expanded access to the intellectual property) when the exact nature of the research 
cannot be contracted upon since the lead product candidate cannot be specified. Moreover, the 
correlation effect is strongest if the financing company is not a pharmaceutical company but a 
biotechnology company. These additional findings are consistent with our model’s prediction that 
the correlation of option design and non-contractibility is stronger if the financing company’s 
alternative use of the intellectual property outside the original research collaboration is more 
valuable: the large (financing) biotechnology company is more likely to be able to use the 
intellectual property rights in a profitable way than a pharmaceutical company would be. Thus, 
the threat of termination is larger and the option contract becomes cheaper. Similarly, we also 
find that the correlation effect is strongest among the most financially constrained firms. As 
predicted by the model, the illiquidity of the R&D company makes option contracts costly and 
reduces the use of those contracts to the cases of non-contractibility. To sum up, cross-
subsidization appears to be addressed by option contracts whenever direct contracting is 
particularly hard and the option contract is not too costly. 
We employ additional empirical tests to distinguish the incomplete-contracts hypothesis 
from other explanations of the correlation between the lack of a contractually specified lead 
product candidate and the termination and intellectual property reversion clauses. A number of 
the alternative explanations, such as heterogeneity in the extent of uncertainty, the degree of 
informational asymmetry, or the “abilities” of the R&D company, would predict a correlation 
with (specific) termination clauses, but not necessarily with the reversion of intellectual property 
rights. Such a correlation, however, cannot be found in the data. In addition, proxies for the 
“research quality” of the R&D firm help to rule out the hypothesis that termination clauses are a 
sorting device. 
Overall, this paper serves three purposes. First, we shed light on a key incentive conflict 
in research collaborations, project cross-subsidization. We characterize the nature of this 
incentive conflict as moral hazard in a multi-tasking framework. Second, we provide new details 
of the empirical contract design of research agreements. In particular, we point to the frequent use 
of unilateral and unconditional termination rights combined with broadened access to the 
intellectual property of the research project. Third, we explain how the combination of 
termination and broadened access to property rights may remedy incentive problems and 
contracting difficulties more generally. Our explanation is based on the assumption of contractual 
incompleteness, which appears to be plausible in research agreements and many other settings.   5
While our empirical application is research agreements in the biotechnology sector, we 
believe that termination rights (and payments) combined with ownership allocation may be used 
in other settings to overcome the limits to contractual complexity. Venture capitalists typically 
provide capital in stages and have the right not to refinance a firm, which Gompers (1995) and 
others have attributed to the difficulty of writing a contract that foresees all contingencies. Not 
providing any refinancing is often equivalent to driving the company into bankruptcy, in which 
case the venture capitalist (who as a preferred stock holder is a senior claimant) ends up owning 
all the assets. A second example is the rising age-earnings profile in companies. Given that 
employment contracts cannot specify all work-related contingencies ex ante, the increase helps 
insure that employees perform as their firm would like them to. In fact, firms face a similar 
problem of financial constraints on the part of the employees as pharmaceutical companies do 
with biotechnology firms. To both set incentives right and to allow the employer to extract the 
surplus from the employment relationship, employees would need to post a bond ex ante. Lazear 
(1979) interprets mandatory retirement as a substitute for such a bond given that employees are 
often unable to post it ex ante.  
Empirical tests of the property rights theory of the firm have largely focused on “make or 
buy” decisions (e.g. Monteverde and Teece (1982); Baker and Hubbard (2003); Acemoglu, 
Aghion, Griffith, and Zilbotti (2003)). The theoretical literature, however, pioneered by 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988, 1990), goes beyond the question of 
integration and outsourcing. In theory, the contracting parties may remedy contractual 
incompleteness by assigning any suitable decision right that governs the actions of the other party 
even though the actions themselves are not contractible. Theory thus implies a much broader 
arena for empirical tests than “make or buy” decisions. Since integration decisions are affected by 
numerous considerations, such as diversification, market power, or deregulation, broader tests are 
an important addition to our understanding of real-world contract design and the empirical 
relevance of the property-rights approach.  
Our paper differs from much of the previous work on strategic alliance and venture 
capital contracts in de-emphasizing the optimal allocation of firm ownership. Most of the 
literature, such as Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Dessein (2003), Schmidt (2003), and Nöldeke and 
Schmidt (1998), focuses on the transfer of control rights over a company or joint venture between 
the contracting parties. In research agreements, however, the financing company may not have 
much interest in owning the entire R&D firm but rather in developing one specific product. 
Moreover, in contrast with the classic relationship-specific investment problem, the researchers of 
the financing company may not be able to benefit from residual control rights, simply because 
they do not have the relevant research expertise. Our framework relates to the literature on 
financial contracting and, in particular, Aghion and Bolton (1992). As in Aghion and Bolton, we   6
                                                
consider the decision of a financing company to provide capital to another company in return for 
some decision rights. However, while the rights are contingent on default in Aghion and Bolton, 
we consider non-contingent rights, namely, the unconditional option to terminate. And, while 
Aghion and Bolton assume fixed transfers, payoffs are contingent (on the decision to exercise the 
option) in our framework.
2  
On the empirical side, our paper relates to previous papers studying the design of real-
world contract design in strategic alliances (Robinson and Stuart (2004)) or venture capital 
contracts (Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)). Rather than focusing on the full set of contractual 
contingencies as in those papers, we illustrate the role of contractibility of outcomes and other 
variables for real-world contract design by studying its covariance with specific contractual 
clauses (namely option rights to terminate). 
Finally, the specific incentive conflict of “academic” versus “commercial” research has 
been analyzed outside of contract theory. The explosion of knowledge in biology and 
biochemistry in the 1970s triggered the adoption of scientific approaches, or “open science” in 
Dasgupta and David’s (1994) terminology, within for-profit organizations such as major 
pharmaceutical companies (Henderson and Cockburn (1994); Gambardella (1995)). A number of 
firms encouraged researchers to pursue basic research, in addition to the applied projects that 
characterized these organizations. The firms that did so enjoyed substantially higher R&D 
productivity than their peers, apparently because their research were better able to identify 
promising scientific developments and because the interaction with cutting-edge research made 
these firms more attractive to top scientists.
3  At the same time, the encouragement of “open 
science” processes has led to difficulties in measuring performance and designing incentive 
schemes (Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (1999)). In fact, partly due to these challenges, firms 
appear to be moving to less of an emphasis on basic science in their research facilities (for a 
discussion, see Rosenbloom and Spencer (1996)). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present stylized 
facts on research collaborations in the biotechnology sector, the incentive conflicts between the 
contracting partners, and the empirical contract design. Section III presents a model that 
 
2Our approach is close to Aghion and Tirole (1994) in emphasizing the inefficiency implications of financial 
constraints. Similar to their work, our model suggests that financial constraints of the research unit may prevent the 
first-best outcome if research efforts are non-contractible, and that the allocation of product ownership helps to 
alleviate this problem. Our model corresponds to a situation in Aghion and Tirole where the research unit has higher 
marginal impact on the output, but the “customer” (i.e., the financing company) has all the bargaining power. 
Differently from the Grossman and Hart (1986) setting employed by Aghion and Tirole, though, we do not explore the 
impact of incentives and financial constraints on ex-ante product ownership, but rather on the “right to govern the 
relationship,” in particular, termination and claims to the intellectual property. Similar to Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 
(2002) and Hart and Holmström (2002), we emphasize a contracting problem that differs from the classic problem of 
relationship-specific investment. 
3Similarly, collaborations between university research labs and for-profit organizations are organized more often as 
sponsored research (instead of ex-post licensing) if more basic research is involved (Thursby and Thursby (2003)).   7
                                                
reconciles the empirical contract design with the observed conflict of interest. We test the 
predictions of the model empirically on a novel contracts data set, introduced in Section IV. The 
empirical tests of our model’s predictions and alternative hypotheses are in Section V. Section VI 
concludes the paper. 
 
II.  Conflicts of Interest in Biotechnology Research Collaborations 
Innovative activities in the biotechnology sector have been increasingly financed via research 
collaborations. While the initial biotechnology companies relied primarily on capital raised from 
the public market, research alliances surpassed public offerings in the 1990s as the dominant 
source of financing for these firms.
4  These research collaborations consist of three phases, a 
research, a development, and a marketing and sales phase. Typically, the pharmaceutical 
company provides the initial financing and the biotechnology company provides the bulk of the 
research, though employees of the larger firm may undertake some as well. The “development” of 
the drug is undertaken jointly. Finally, marketing and sales are mostly in the hands of the 
pharmaceutical company. The research and development phases are characterized by 
considerable uncertainty as to project success. In 200 alliances entered into between 1980 and 
1995 analyzed by Lerner, Shane and Tsai (2003), only 14% had led to an approved project by 
December 1998. Of those in the discovery stage at the time of the alliance signing, only 5% had 
led to an approved drug: in fact, only 31% had reached clinical trials at all by this point. 
As the dominant research-performing entity, the biotechnology firm typically receives the 
intellectual property rights, but commits to license the relevant patent holdings and know-how to 
its partner for the life of the agreement (and in many cases thereafter). The contract frequently 
delineates the right to manufacture the product, which may be assigned to one of the parties or 
divided between the two. Most of the profits from the final project go to the pharmaceutical 
company, though the biotechnology company also reaps a certain percentage via the royalties 
from licensing. 
The pervasiveness of research agreements between pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies is puzzling since the interests of the two partners are typically not fully aligned and 
since it is often hard to contract on research activities. We conducted a number of interviews with 
executives specializing in management, technology transfer, and legal affairs to clarify these 
issues. From these interviews, we learned that project substitution and project cross-subsidization 
by the biotechnology researchers are major concerns of pharmaceutical companies entering 
research agreements. While it is the objective of the financing company to develop a certain 
 
4 See Lerner and Merges (1998).   8
                                                
viable and profitable drug, the R&D firm has multiple interests. On the one hand, the researchers 
in the biotechnology laboratories of the R&D firm are also interested in developing the proposed 
drug and ensuring future cash flows. On the other hand, they are typically juggling several 
research projects. Some of these projects may be commercialized in collaboration with other 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms, on terms that may be more favorable than this 
collaboration. In addition, the R&D firm may be seeking to develop wholly owned products, from 
which they will receive all the profits. Success in these solely developed products may also be 
particularly valued by the equity markets as an indicator of the acumen of the R&D firm’s 
management. As a result, the researchers in the R&D firm may be tempted to employ resources 
from a specific research agreement for other projects.
5 
In addition to these commercial conflicts, an additional challenge relates to the complex 
goals of the biotechnology researchers. Researchers in biotechnology companies are typically 
much more academically oriented than those in pharmaceutical companies. Biotechnology firms 
are often founded and guided by long-time academics who may still want to impact the academic 
discussion; they often employ post-doctoral students who are considering an academic career in 
the future; and their reputation in the market for future research agreements depends to a large 
extent on the external assessment of their research abilities. To cite a characteristic example, the 
researchers of the biotechnology company may want to spend time and effort running additional 
experiments to satisfy academic requirements for a publication in a top journal, even though there 
is already enough evidence to start the process for approval by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration for the drug and the financing partner would like to press ahead with the approval 
process. All these pressures may lead to biotechnology firms pursuing projects or research 
activities that are more fundamental than the pharmaceutical company would prefer, and often 
seeking to publish these results before the pharmaceutical company prefers. These forms of 
conflict seem very important in this context, and have not been previously explored in the 
literature on research collaborations.
6 
A variant of this incentive problem is that researchers of the biotechnology firm tend to 
terminate unsuccessful projects too late. This can happen for several reasons. First, as described 
above, additional research on a given project can be beneficial to the researcher’s scientific 
reputation even though it is not profit maximizing for the pharmaceutical company. Second, 
researchers and especially founders of biotechnology firms may be “attached” to the initial 
 
5 For instance, in 1993, established biotechnology firm Alkermes sued the smaller firm, Cortex Pharmaceuticals, which 
it had entered into a research agreement with the year before. It alleged that Cortex’s research on a calpain-inhibiting 
drug for cerebral vasospasm violated Alkermes' exclusive right to develop applications for neurological disorders 
(Alkermes, Inc. v. Cortex Pharmaceuticals Inc., Civil Docket no. 93-CV-12532, U.S. District Court for Massachusetts 
(Boston), 1993.). 
6 Stern (2003) points out that scientists are willing to accept lower wages in return for being able to pursue more 
science-oriented research.   9
                                                
biotechnological component employed in a research agreement since it constitutes their principal 
discovery. Such behavior has been labeled “founder syndrome.” In fact, we learnt in the course of 
our interviews that founders often leave the company when the initial technology researched is 
finally abandoned, asserting that they do not “morally own” the company any more. Third, it 
appears to be hard for researchers to admit that a project ought to be terminated and they thus 
tend to hold on to projects for too long.
7 Fourth, the researchers in the biotechnology companies 
may have empire-building preferences and thus attempt to maximize the number of ongoing 
projects.  
These types of moral hazard problems are closely related to the project cross-
subsidization problem laid out initially. Here, the biotechnology researchers do not work on a 
different project than the pharmaceutical company would like them to work on, but they continue 
working on a project even though the pharmaceutical company would like them to declare the 
research to be either completed or to have been unsuccessful. Similar to the original cross-
subsidization problem, it is often hard for pharmaceutical companies to determine when the 
biotechnology researchers are engaging in such undesired research. Both from a modeling and an 
empirical perspective, we can re-interpret project substitution as substitution of project 
termination with undesired research and thus capture these latter variants. 
An illustration of the possibilities of opportunistic behavior that can emerge from the 
behavior of the R&D firm is the research agreement between ALZA, a California-based drug 
delivery company founded in 1968, and the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Ciba-Geigy.
8  The two 
firms signed a research agreement in 1978. ALZA also engaged in a variety of independent 
activities, including forming alliances to exploit technologies that did not conflict with the topics 
being jointly explored with Ciba-Geigy. 
Due to ALZA’s financial weakness, Ciba-Geigy was able to obtain vast control rights, 
such as eight of ALZA’s eleven board seats, majority voting control, extensive information rights, 
and the ability to guide 90% of ALZA’s research activities through a number of review panels 
that were dominated by Ciba-Geigy representatives. Nevertheless, numerous tensions arose over 
the exact type of research the ALZA researchers should be conducting. In particular, Ciba-Geigy 
was concerned about other research projects and research collaborations of ALZA. ALZA 
representatives kept seeking to establish collaborations with third parties. Ciba-Geigy found it 
difficult to control the activities of ALZA despite these seemingly ironclad control rights. While 
the boards ultimately approved most of ALZA’s requests, ALZA representatives became 
frustrated at the long delays associated with the process. As a result, ALZA scientists began 
 
7Cf. Stulz (1990). 
8This account is based on Angelmar and Doz (1987-1989).   10
                                                
bypassing the various review panels and directly contacting senior Ciba-Geigy officials for 
permission to engage in outside arrangements. While detailed reporting and monitoring processes 
had been stipulated in the original agreement, these proved very difficult to enforce. Ciba-Geigy 
officials believed that ALZA scientists were publishing materials in journals that would have 
been best reserved for the collaboration. Ciba-Geigy officials, worried that their proprietary 
technology might be disclosed in these publications or employed in ALZA’s collaborations with 
other pharmaceutical firms, became increasingly reluctant to disclose their own technologies in 
the area of drug delivery to ALZA. Ultimately, these tensions led to the dissolution of the 
research collaboration at the end of 1981. These conflicts, while perhaps extreme, illustrate the 
difficulties that the types of problems delineated above can have on parties. 
Only in a subset of these cases can the parties remedy this incentive conflict directly by 
specifying the exact nature of the research activities to be undertaken by the researchers or by 
conditioning on the outcomes of specific tests. In this subset of cases, the parties have typically 
identified a specific lead product candidate at the beginning of their collaboration. It is thus 
relatively easy for them to separate out unrelated research. In many cases, however, the exact lead 
product candidate to be tested is not yet specifiable and the research agreement is entered without 
a clear and concrete product in mind. The research agreements, then, have to account for 
contractual incompleteness – for having “too many” future contingencies that are “too hard to 
think of” to contract upon them. The risk for the financing company is then that the 
biotechnology company forms multiple research agreements around a single promising but poorly 
understood compound, partnering with one firm to address one disease and with another to 
address a second.
9  In these cases, it is likely to be very difficult to delineate the boundaries of 
each project. In this paper, we are exploiting exactly this variation in contractibility, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective. 
 
III. Model 
We present a simple model that illustrates how variations in contractibility affect the design of the 
research agreements. We consider a financially constrained research company R and a financing 
company F, both risk-neutral. (All variable definitions are summarized in Appendix A.) The 
model distinguishes between an initial research phase and a reduced-form development, 
marketing, and sales phase, as depicted in Figure 1. If the financing company provides initial 
financing I–e. g., to set up a laboratory–then R can perform research. R’s research yields an 
 
9 Given these conflicts, it is not surprising that a significant fraction of research collaborations are terminated before 
their contractually specified life (Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003)). Indeed, in a number of cases, the failure of the 
biotechnology company to assign activities allegedly in a research agreement’s scope to their collaborative partner has 
triggered litigation. See footnote 5. intermediate product, the production technology. If advanced through development, marketing, 
and sales, the production technology generates two types of surplus. The “narrow” (or 
“commercial”) surplus, denoted by N, results from the sales of the envisioned marketable product 
of the research collaboration. The “broad” (or “scientific”) surplus, denoted as B, captures both 
profits and scientific reputation from unrelated discoveries, which are less valuable to F. Both 
types of surplus are ex ante uncertain. 
In the initial research phase, the biotechnology researchers can either focus on the 
narrowly defined research project or engage in broader research activities. Narrow (commercial) 
research effort eN leads to a technology that generates a higher expected level of commercial 
surplus,  N , than broad (commercial) research eB, which results in N. At the same time, the 
technology resulting from eN generates only a low expected level of scientific surplus, B, while 
eB would result in a high level, B. Our analysis focuses on the case  I N > . Both the high and the 
low level of both types of surplus remain uncertain at the end of the research phase. 
How much narrow and broad surplus the parties can extract also depends (i) on their 
collaboration after the initial research phase and (ii) on the allocation of property rights. 
As for the first determinant, we assume that the parties can extract the full amount of 
narrow surplus N if they continue to collaborate. They can extract only a portion α, α ∈ (0,1), if 
the collaboration is terminated after the research phase. The ex-post efficiency losses from 
breaking up the research relationship and continuing the narrow research with another partner 
reflect both the specialization of biotechnology researchers and the search costs associated with 
finding a new partner. Specifically, the development phase involves the preliminary production 
and also the approval process at the FDA. Changes and adjustments to regulatory requirements 
will induce the parties to “go back to science” and thus benefit from the efforts of R as well as 
from the procedural and production know-how of F.  The amount of broad surplus B, on the other 
hand, does not depend on the continued collaboration of the two initial research partners. It 
captures the value of future projects with different research partners and general scientific 
reputation. (We will not consider explicitly any development and transformation from research 
technology into realized surplus.)  
As for the second determinant of whether the parties garner the full surplus, the relevant 
property rights in our context are licensing and intellectual property rights. The surplus is non-
contractible and accrues to the holder of the intellectual property rights.  By default, this is R as 
the patent holder unless F has obtained the rights from R. Rights to the narrow surplus and to the 
broad surplus can be contracted on separately.
10  Narrow rights (typically licensing rights) allow 
                                                 
10 We assume that the relevant technologies entail an exclusive license. This assumption is consistent with the nature of 
typical agreements, where the financing firm is granted exclusivity in an important range of applications. 
  11F to sell the envisioned product of the collaboration and to reap the surplus N from its sales. 
Broad rights allow F to develop and sell the less related side products.  
Finally, we assume that R cannot extract any portion of N without granting F the narrow 
(licensing) rights. This assumption captures that the final marketing and sales stages rely on the 
capacity of F to undertake large-scale manufacturing as well as on F’s marketing and distribution 
channels. Given R’s financial constraints as well as the stochastic and non-contractible nature of 
N, R needs to grant F the narrow (licensing) rights to induce F’s collaboration, and thus F obtains 
the narrow surplus. Otherwise, the narrow surplus is lost.  
This does not hold for B. We assume that R can extract the full amount of broad surplus B 
if R retains the broad rights, but that F can extract only a portion εB, ε ∈ (0,1) if granted the broad 
rights. This assumption captures the different nature of B compared to N. Future research, 
building on the broad technology, may lead to enhanced scientific reputation, which is more 
valuable to the academically oriented researchers in the biotechnology company than to the 
pharmaceutical company. Moreover, to the extent that B reflects the sales potential of unrelated 
products, it may prove useful to R for other (current or future) research collaborations with 
companies that have a different specialization and value the specific outcome more highly, but it 
is of little interest to F. We also assume that  
R chooses eB if indifferent between eN  and eB.   (A.1) 
Assumption A.1 can be interpreted as a reduced-form substitute for modeling explicitly non-
transferable benefits of choosing eB. It may capture unalienable benefits to the biotechnology 
researchers from pursuing the broader, more scientific research, such as acquiring non-
transferable general human capital. 
We assume that the financing company F makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to R and 
extracts the entire surplus beyond R’s reservation utility. This assumption reflects that there are 
many biotechnology companies seeking funding, relative to the number of potential capital 
providers. We do not model the effort costs of R explicitly. Rather, we assume that R is willing to 
sign a contract only if the expected payoff amounts to at least the expected value of the broad 
rights after narrow research, B: 
The reservation utility of R is B.   (A.2) 
For simplicity, we focus on the case
11 
B B ε > .        (A.3) 
In order to illustrate the role of option rights, we first derive the optimal contract under 
the assumption that the research effort of R is contractible. Next, we derive the optimal no-option 
                                                 
11 This assumption simply reduces the number of cases to be considered (see Appendix B). 
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contract under the assumption that R’s research is observable
12 but not verifiable. We then 
introduce option rights and analyze whether they allow the financing company to extract a greater 
share of the surplus. In particular, we consider the option to terminate the research collaboration 
after F has observed R’s effort and the research output of the initial research phase. Note that this 
implies that collaboration in the development phase is contractible and that the courts can observe 
termination, i.e., which of the parties (if any) decided not to continue the collaboration after the 
research phase. We assume 
F terminates if indifferent between termination and continuation.   (A.4) 
The focus on option rights to terminate the collaboration reflects the empirical purpose of the 
model. While we do derive the optimality of a specific option contract among all option contracts 
that condition intellectual property rights on the decision to terminate, we do not explore the 
optimality of other option contracts.
13 
As depicted in Figure 1, the time-line is as follows. At t = 0, the two parties enter into a 
contract. The contract specifies: 
(i)  the initial payment I by the financing company F at t = 1, 
(ii)  the conditions for termination (if any) at t = 2, 
(iii) the  payments  from  F to R at t = 2, 
(iv) the  rights  F obtains from R, which may be narrow or broad. 
After the initial investment I and research effort e, the parties observe the intermediate research 
output and conditional expected values of N and B. In the case of option contracts, the option 
holder decides whether to continue the research collaboration, and R obtains the resulting 
payment. The narrow surplus is realized after commercialization at t = 3. The payoff from broad 
surplus is generated via different (unmodeled) research activities in the future at or after t = 3. 
Thus, R cannot use these payoffs for payments to F. In fact, since R is credit constrained, there is 




12 We also developed an alternative model specification where F cannot observe e directly but infers it from the 
intermediate research output at the end of period 1. The alternative model also removes the assumption that the final 
surplus N is non-contractible (which is a simplified way to capture the role of F in the last phase of the collaboration 
and the potential moral hazard problems) and allows for royalty fees. Introducing signal extraction and surplus sharing 
complicates the model, but the basic trade-off and determinants of the use of option rights are the same. 
13 Most of the alternative option contracts are hard to implement practically, which can be captured with weak 
additional assumptions. Consider, for example, a contract that gives F directly the option to seize intellectual property 
rights (rather than a termination option, on which the rights are then conditioned). In practice, however, F cannot 
simply “seize” the rights from R, and it is hard to imagine a contract that obliges R to grant both narrow and broad 
rights at the will of F while continuing to collaborate. 
14 We therefore do not explicitly model the initial “bargaining process” between F and R. There is scope for bargaining 
after  R has exerted the initial research effort e, however, and we will consider the bargaining process during 
renegotiation (under the assumption of no commitment) explicitly. In the benchmark case where the type of research to be undertaken by R is contractible, 
the parties can condition (ii)–(iv) on the type of research effort e. In the case of limited 
contractibility, e is observable but not verifiable and (ii)–(iv) cannot be conditioned on e.
15 In the 
case of the option contract, one party may obtain the right to terminate the collaboration at the 
end of period 1. Whether or not the option-holder exercises the option right is verifiable, and (ii)-
(iv) can thus be conditioned on continuation or termination.  
Formally, a contract A specifies an action  } , { T C a∈ , where C stands for continuation and 
T for termination, payments   and   from F  to  R in case of continuation and 
termination respectively, and property rights oC and oT accruing to F in case of continuation and 
termination respectively.
16 With some abuse of notation, we will denote the case that F receives 
no intellectual property rights after action a as oa = ∅, the case that F receives broad rights as 
oa = B, the case of narrow rights as oa = N, and the case of both broad and narrow rights as 
oa = B + N. In the case of full contractibility, a, pC, pT, oC, and oT can be conditioned on e ∈ {eN, 
eB}; in the case of limited contractibility, they cannot. An option contract gives one party 
 the right to choose a and specifies the conditional payments and ownership rights. Note 
that giving R the option right makes the game equivalent to having R choose simultaneously e and 
a. Figure 2 summarizes the payoffs of both parties under different continuation (or termination) 
and intellectual property (IP) rights scenarios. 
0 ≥ C p 0 ≥ T p
} , { F R i∈
  
Contractibility. In the case of contractible effort, it is easy to see that F maximizes its payoff by 
inducing R to exert eN and claiming only the narrow rights. F can simply condition a higher 
payoff on the desired action. The payoff of F is thus  I N − , and R’s payoff is B .  
Note that this is not necessarily the surplus-maximizing outcome since  N B +  may be 
larger than  N B + . In this case, the financial constraints of the biotechnology company prevent 
the parties from agreeing on the first-best and having the biotechnology company compensate its 
partner ex ante, akin to Aghion and Tirole (1994). 
 
Limited contractibility without options. If the type of research undertaken by R is observable 
but not verifiable, the parties cannot condition payments and actions on e.  R will always choose 
eB. Given Assumption A.3, it is profit-maximizing for F to acquire only the narrow rights since 
this dispenses with the need to pay R’s reservation wage. Thus, F’s expected payoff is N – I, and 
                                                 
15 As mentioned above (footnote 12), the alternative assumption that not e but only intermediate output is observable 
does not affect the basic insights about the use of option rights. 
16 We leave out the initial financing I since it does not vary across contracts. 
  14R gets  Bif a contract is signed. However, if N < I, the parties will not sign a research agreement 
and forgo the narrow and broad surplus. We denote the set of contracts that maximize F’s profit 
(including “no contract”) under limited contractibility in the class of contracts without options as 




NO Π } 0 , max{
* I N NO − = Π . 
 
Limited contractibility with options. In order to overcome the contracting problem, the parties 
may generate other decision rights for which the outcome (i.e., the action taken) is contractible. 
We consider the option right to terminate the relationship after the biotechnology researchers 
have exerted their research effort and before the final surplus N is generated. We denote such 
contracts as  . We focus on option contracts that strictly improve F’s payoff 
over the highest payoff F can obtain from a contract without options. We first show that an option 
contract that 
) , , , , ( T C T C O o o p p i A =
•  grants F the right to terminate after R’s initial research effort and 
•  allocates both the narrow and the broad rights to F if F terminates, but only narrow 
rights if F continues 
may yield a higher expected payoff for F than the second-best no-option contract (Lemmas 1 to 
3). We then show that no other option contract can increase F’s expected payoff as much or more 
beyond the highest payoff without options (Lemma 4) and derive the equilibrium contract design 
and payoff (Proposition 1). All results are derived in a setting without renegotiation. In 
Appendix C, we allow for contract renegotiation. There, we analyze explicitly when the derived 
option contract is renegotiation-proof (Lemma 5) and account for renegotiation when deriving the 
contractual choice of F (Proposition 2). 
 
Lemma 1. An option contract (i, pC, pT, oC, oT) with i = F, oC = N, and oT = N + B implements eN  
iff  
B N p p B N T C ε α ε α − − ≥ − > − − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( .    ( 1 )  
 
Proof. We first show that prices (pC, pT) satisfying (1) are necessary and sufficient to induce F to 
terminate if and only if R chooses eB. Under the contractual provisions described in Lemma 1, F 
terminates upon observing eB if  T C p B N p N − + ≤ − ε α , and F continues upon observing eN if 
T C p B N p N − + > − ε α . Solving these two inequalities for pC - pT  yields (1). 
It remains to be shown that R chooses eN, given F’s conditional termination decisions. R receives 
payoff pT for effort eB and  C p B +  for effort eN. Hence, R chooses eN if and only if  B p p T C − > − . 
This is implied by (1) since  B B B N p p T C − > − > − − ≥ − ε ε α) 1 (  with assumption A.3. Q.E.D. 
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To provide some intuition, note that the upper bound of the price differential between 
continuation and termination, i.e., the left-hand side of double-inequality (1), ensures that F 
chooses continuation after eN. Similarly, the lower bound and right-hand side of (1) ensures that F 
chooses termination after eB. An option contract satisfying (1) relies on two main features to 
implement eN. First, termination reduces the amount of narrow surplus F can obtain since  1 < α . 
Thus, holding other payoffs constant, F prefers continuation over termination. Second, F attains 
some of the broad surplus if allocated the broad rights since  0 > ε . Thus, the allocation of broad 
rights can be used to make the threat of termination less costly to F.  
Within the class of incentive compatible option contracts, satisfying (1), we can 
characterize the set of contracts that generate the highest profits for F. Denote the left-hand side 
of (1),  B N ε α − − ) 1 ( , as Γ and the right-hand side of (1),  B N ε α − − ) 1 ( , as ∆. The following 
Lemma characterizes the solution to F’s maximization problem.  
 






∆ > Γ ≥ ∆ − Γ − ∈
∆ > > Γ ∆ − ∈
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 maximizes F’s payoff. 
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where the first constraint ensures incentive compatibility for R and F, the second is the 
participation constraint for R, and the constraints in the last line capture that R is financially 
constrained. We can simplify this program to  















p p t s
p
T C
We distinguish three sub cases. (a) If Γ > ∆  ≥  0, then   0 is redundant and setting   = 
and   = 0 is optimal. (b) If   > 0 > 
C p ≥ C p
∆ T p Γ ∆ , then the non-negativity constraint on   is binding.  C p
  16Therefore, setting   = 0 and picking any    C p T p ∈ [0, −∆ ] is optimal. (c) If 0 ≥  >∆ , then the 
non-negativity constraint on   is again binding but setting   = 0 requires −Γ <     −
Γ
C p C p T p ≤ ∆ .  
Q.E.D. 
 
  Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration. Intuitively, Γ and ∆ capture the gain to F from 
continuation (relative to termination) if R chooses eN or eB respectively. To ensure that F does 
not choose continuation after R exerted the undesired broad effort eB, an optimal contract requires 
F to pay the gain from continuation after eB, ∆, upon continuation (if there is a gain, i.e., if ∆ is 
positive). If R were not financially constrained, F could implement termination at zero cost, i.e. 
with pC = 0, by setting  < 0. But since that is not possible, the outside option of termination is 
not attractive unless F sets a positive continuation price. Similarly, to ensure that F does not 
choose termination after R exerted the desired narrow effort eN, an optimal contract requires F to 
pay more than the gain from termination, –Γ, upon termination (if there is a gain, i.e., if Γ is 
negative). 
T p
Thus F’s total expected payoff is  I N − ∆ − } , 0 max{ , which we denote as  , and R’s 
total expected payoff is 
O Π ˆ
} , 0 max{ ∆ + B . Denote the set of option contracts (F, pC, pT, N, N + B) 
satisfying (2) as ÂO. We can now characterize the conditions under which   >  , i.e., under 
which F prefers any contract in ÂO to any contract in the set of profit-maximizing contracts in the 
class of no-option contracts,  . 





Lemma 3. The expected payoff of F under contract in ÂO,  , is higher than the expected payoff 





NO Π ∆ > − } , max{ I N N . 
 
Proof.  If  0 ≥ − I N , then  ∆ > − ⇔ ∆ > − ⇔ Π > Π N N N N NO O } 0 , max{ ˆ * , where the last 
biconditional follows from  N N > . If  0 < − I N , then    ⇔    ⇔ 
* ˆ
NO O Π > Π } , 0 max{ ˆ ΠO ∆ >
∆ > − I N , where the last biconditional follows from the assumption  I N > . The two cases can 
be summarized as   >   ⇔  O Π ˆ *
NO Π ∆ > − } , max{ I N N .  Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 3 implies that an option contract is more likely to improve over the best no-
option contract the higher the outside options of F in case of termination are, as captured by a 
high α and a high ε. For high enough α and ε, the gain from continuing after eB is either negative 
(∆  <  0) or at least smaller than the increase in narrow surplus if R exerts eN rather than eB 
  17( N N − < ∆  or  I N − < ∆ ). Intuitively, the more surplus F can reap without the continued 
collaboration of R – either narrow surplus (high α) or broad surplus (high ε) – the higher is the 
threat for R that F may terminate and the cheaper is the option contract for F. 
 
So far, we have focused on one type of option contract, contracts in  , and shown they 
induce R to exert narrow effort (Lemma 1) and may improve F’s payoff (Lemma 3). We now 
consider the entire class of option contracts (i, pC, pT, oC, oT) and show that no other option 
contract can increase F’s payoff over the highest non-option payoff   by as much or more 






Lemma 4. For all option contracts that are not in ÂO, the expected payoff  O Π  is characterized 
by 
O O NO O Π < Π ∨ Π ≤ Π ˆ * . 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
Lemma 4 states that all other option contracts lead to lower payoffs than ÂO whenever ÂO is 
preferred to the unconditional contract. As long as F sticks to the unconditional contract 
whenever indifferent – e.g., due to other frictions in option contracting that are not modeled – we 
should thus observe either the unconditional contract or ÂO, but no other option contracts. We 
summarize the equilibrium contract design and payoff for F in the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. If  } , max{ I N N − < ∆ , F implements any option contract from ÂO and obtains 




} 0 , max{
* I N NO − = Π . 
 
The optimality condition for the option contract,  } , max{ I N N − < ∆ , i.e., 
} , max{ ) 1 ( I N N B N − < − − ε α , is likely to be satisfied if the outside options of the financing 
company are large, as captured by high α and ε. In other words, the lower the value of R’s 
cooperation in the development phase and the lower the loss of surplus if B is diverted to F, the 
more of a threat of termination R faces. Attractive outside options make it less costly for F to 
induce R to exert eN , and the option contract becomes more profitable. 
The simple model illustrates that the conflict of research interests between the financing 
company and the R&D Company may prevent the parties from entering research collaboration 
  18and generating surplus whenever the exact nature of the research activities is not contractible. 
However, the parties can overcome this problem by assigning the unilateral and unconditional 
right to terminate to the financing company. The higher the financing company’s outside options 
are, the more likely is it that the option contract is optimal. However, to prevent opportunistic 
exercise of the option right, payments conditional on termination and continuation need to be 
specified. Given the financial constraints of the research company and the necessary difference 
between continuation and termination payments, the financing company may not be able to 
extract the full profit  N – I. Without introducing financially unconstrained firms formally into the 
model, we can thus conclude that the use of option contracts covaries with the contractibility of 
research efforts for financially constrained firms but not necessarily for financially unconstrained 
firms. If a research company is financially unconstrained, the option contract as well as other, 
unconditional contracts allows the financing company to extract the full surplus. Thus, the option 
contract may or may not be employed, regardless of the contractibility of research efforts. 
We thus reach three main predictions: 
 
Prediction 1. Option contracts assigning the right to terminate with reversion of broad property 
rights to the financing company are more likely if research activities are not contractible. 
 
Prediction 2. While research agreements with financially constrained R&D companies employ 
the termination clause with broad access to the terminated project only if research is non-
contractible, research agreements with financially less constrained or unconstrained 
biotechnology companies may employ either the termination clause or other contract design with 
or without research contractibility. 
 
Prediction 3. If the research activities of the R&D Company cannot be contracted upon, the 
higher is the ex-post outside option of the financing company in case of separation from the initial 
R&D partner, the more likely is it that the research agreement employs an option design with 
termination and broad rights (conditional on termination) for the financing company. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we will test these predictions empirically. In addition, we 
will lie out alternative hypotheses for the correlation between the termination clause with broad 
rights and non-contractible research efforts. Further empirical tests, which account for variations 
in uncertainty, in informational asymmetry, in research abilities of the biotechnology company, 
and in the misalignment of incentives, allow us to distinguish between the model and alternative 
explanations. 
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IV. Data 
To test how the contractual design responds to variations in contractibility and, in particular, to 
analyze different explanations for the prevalence of termination rights, we collected a novel data 
set of research agreements. This section describes how we collected the sample and describes 
some stylized features about the contract design. 
In undertaking this analysis, we sought to employ as large a sample of research 
agreements between biotechnology companies and commercial partners as possible. These 
partners are either pharmaceutical companies or other (larger) biotechnology firms. We employed 
all agreements between 1980 and 2001 that had been analyzed by Recombinant Capital and that 
met certain criteria discussed below. 
Recombinant Capital is a San Francisco-based consulting firm that specializes (since 
1988) in tracking contracts in the biotechnology industry. They prepare summaries of the 
contracts that are marketed directly to parties who are negotiating research agreements and 
strategic alliances and who are seeking data on comparable transactions. In addition, 
Recombinant Capital’s staff uses their database to prepare comparative studies of particular terms 
in these agreements. The summaries are based on filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and other regulatory bodies. The contracts are made public because the 
publicly traded firms are required by the SEC to file “material documents.” Biotechnology 
companies tend to interpret this requirement conservatively, and often file the contracts 
specifying alliances as amendments to 10-K, 10-Q, S-1, or 8-K statements. In addition, a number 
of state governments require privately held companies with employee stock option plans to file 
“material documents,” which are made available to the public. Notice, however, that a large part 
of the documents thus pertain to publicly traded biotechnology companies rather than early-stage 
start-up companies. While some information in these agreements is redacted (not made publicly 
available), Recombinant Capital’s staff culls through other SEC filings, news stories, and press 
releases in order to compile as much data as possible. 
We eliminated a number of the summarized transactions in the Recombinant Capital 
database in an effort to minimize “undesirable” heterogeneity. The eliminated contracts are: 
•  Research agreements involving universities, medical centers, other non-profit 
organizations, and government agencies. 
•  Research agreements where one of the parties had a controlling interest in the other, 
either through a majority equity stake or through a purchase option (e.g. an alliance 
between a firm and one of its R&D limited partnerships).   21
•  “Renegotiated agreements,” i.e., we excluded cases in which the two parties had a 
previous research collaboration covering the same set of technologies. 
•  “Marketing-only agreements” i.e., cases with neither a research nor a product 
development component. 
•  Contracts with more than two firms. 
While a number of the above sub samples provide interesting variations on the conflict of interest, 
in particular an exacerbated contrast between scientific and commercial interests in the case of 
research collaborations with universities, the contract design in these cases varies substantially, 
mostly reflecting institutional constraints. For examples, many universities require a minimum 
duration of financial support in order to be able to staff the project and set up other infrastructure. 
Also, the lack of trade secrets and the higher pressure to publish in universities induce additional 
caution on the side of the pharmaceutical companies, resulting in more protective contract design. 
Therefore, we eliminated the above sub samples and ended up with a total of 584 contracts. We 
carefully examined the contracts and coded the key features of the greatest interest for our 
analysis (see discussion below). 
  Table 1 summarizes the contractual features. The research agreements range from 1980 
to 2001, with a disproportionate representation of later contracts due to the growth of activity in 
the industry. The research collaborations range widely in length, averaging about four years.   
We will wish to control for the quality of the biotechnology firms in the analyses below. 
Biotechnology companies may differ substantially in quality: for instance, the seasoning of the 
key executives and the scientific reputation of the advisors may differ sharply. These differences 
are difficult to parameterize, though. As a proxy, we will use the reputation of the investment 
banker who takes the biotechnology firm public: a biotechnology firm underwritten by Morgan 
Stanley, all else being equal, is likely to be a higher-quality firm than one taken public by D.H. 
Blair. We determine the ranking of the firm using the ratings compiled by Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004). We use the rating that 
covers the particular time period when the firm went public. If the rating for that period is not 
available, we employ the rating in the most proximate period.  
The focus of our analysis is on the differences in contract design depending on the degree 
of contractibility of the research activities and (intermediate) research output. To capture such 
variations in contractibility we examine variations in the condition of the lead product candidate 
at the time the transaction is signed. Recombinant Capital provides a detailed description of how 
concretely the main research target is specified. The primary distinction we will make in our 
analysis is between agreements that build upon a well-defined (contractible) lead product 
candidate and those where the research program is described in more general terms, without   22
referring to a specifiable lead product candidate. Our rationale is that in the latter settings (which 
represent 37.5% of the total), it is hard to specify the exact research tasks and it is therefore least 
likely that the contractual partners can deal with the cross-subsidization problem directly (in the 
form of contingent contracting). We would thus expect the use of termination rights with 
reversion to be more likely in this case. 
We relied on the classification scheme of Recombinant Capital to identify contracts with 
and without a pre-specified lead product candidate. The distinction is rather apparent from the 
language used in the different types of contract. Lacking a specific compound or process, the 
contract is less specific and involves a broader “discovery” phase. We illustrate the distinction 
with a few examples from the “Field of Use” section or preamble of the contract (as specified by 
Recombinant Capital), which define the scope of the research collaboration. Research agreements 
that build upon a pre-specified lead product candidate read as follows: 
 
  “ISIS has discovered ISIS 3521, an antisense oligonucleotide, and is developing a 
product containing ISIS 3521 for the treatment of cancer... ISIS will use 
commercially reasonable efforts to complete ongoing clinical trials and studies of the 
Product for non-small cell lung cancer and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, as further 
described in the Development Plan set forth in Exhibit C hereto, and will participate 
in related activities, including the provision of consulting support to LILLY, in 
furtherance of the Development Program under the terms and conditions set forth in 
this Agreement.... “ISIS 3521” means the phosphorothioate oligodeoxyribonucleotide 
that targets human protein kinase C alpha disclosed and claimed (as SEQ IDNO 2) 
in U.S. Patent No. 5,703,054.” (Development and License Agreement, ISIS 
Pharmaceuticals and Eli Lilly & Co., August 14, 2001.) 
 
  “The Parties desire to engage in a joint research effort to identify or discover, on the 
basis of Celgene's lead and library compounds, SERMs which are Er(alpha)Selective 
in U2OS cells, including, without limitation, compounds in the SP500263 Series (as 
defined below), as well as analogs thereof made by Celgene prior to the Effective 
Date as part of its internal research program in the Oncology Field (as defined 
below) to develop pharmaceutical products from such compounds for the treatment, 
prevention and diagnosis of osteoporosis and for other indications as described 
herein... “SP500263 Series” shall mean Celgene's proprietary compounds claimed in 
U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 09/475,776, filed December 1999 (or any 
continuation, continuation-in-part or division thereof), including, without limitation, 
SP500263, SPC0001422 and SPC0001426. The SP500263 Series shall specifically   23
exclude Celgene's proprietary compound known as SPC0008490... “U2OS Cells” 
shall mean (a) Celgene's patent U2OS cell line, (b) Celgene's ER(alpha)-transfected 
U2OS cell line (clone #: B-11), or (c) Celgene's ER(beta)-transfected U2OS cell line 
(clone#: 10).” (Collaborative Research and License Agreement, Celgene Corp and 
Novartis Pharma AG, December 20, 2000.) 
 
Examples of contracts without a pre-specified lead product candidate read instead as 
follows: 
 
  “Cubist and Novartis will establish a research program to identify and validate a 
limited number of antibacterial targets and to develop a select number of validated 
assays for high-throughput screening to identify new lead compounds active against 
such validated targets for the development of drugs... Cubist agrees to utilize its 
proprietary VITA(TM) technology in the Research Program as determined by the 
Joint Research Steering Committee... which couples the validation of the inhibition of 
a target in an animal model during an established infection with assay development 
and screening for the discovery of novel drug leads.” (Collaborative and License 
Agreement, Cubist Pharmaceuticals and Novartis, February 3, 1999.) 
 
  “The goals of the MBI Discovery Program are (a) to identify and characterize Level I 
Qualified Proteins employing various discovery methodologies, including without 
limitation secreted protein trapping, genomic cluster mapping and EST sequencing, 
(b) to identify the therapeutic utility of Program Proteins employing various 
methodologies, including without limitation transcription expression profiling, 
animal disease recovery modeling and use of transgenic and knock out models, and 
(c) to qualify selected Program Proteins for further development by the Parties as 
Therapeutic Products.” (Collaboration Agreement, Millennium BioTherapeutics and 
Eli Lilly & Co., May 28, 1997.) 
 
The level of detail and specificity is much lower in the latter set of contracts. As a result, it is 
harder to pin down the concrete research tasks to be performed by the biotechnology researchers. 
In supplemental regressions, we also consider a more narrow definition of contractibility, 
restricted to projects with a well-defined lead product candidate that has also been tested. The 
results are little changed.   24
  In Table 1, we also present some summary data on the financial condition of the R&D 
firm. Most firms have only very modest revenues and financial resources, though there are a few 
positive outliers. 
 
V. Empirical  Analysis 
We analyze how the contractual design responds to different degrees of contractibility with 
particular focus on termination and broad intellectual property rights. We face two choices 
regarding the nature of the dependent variable used in the analysis. Which provisions should be 
regarded as indicating whether the financing company had termination and broadened access to 
the terminated project? And how should the dependent variable be measured? 
We wish to determine the extent to which the financing firm was granted the 
unconditional right to unilaterally terminate the agreement and obtain the rights to the product 
upon termination. While a wide variety of clauses allow the financing firm to terminate the 
agreement, most of those are conditional on specific events, such as bankruptcy or acquisition of 
the R&D company. To capture contractual remedies that are based on non-verifiability 
information, we focus on cases where the financing firm can terminate the agreement without a 
clear trigger. Three cases appeared in the agreements we reviewed that met our criteria: 
•  When the financing company can terminate the agreement for any cause, either within a 
defined time period (e.g., after one year of the agreement’s signing) or at any stage of the 
research collaboration. 
•  When the financing firm can terminate the research collaboration for “misbehavior” or 
“breach” of the agreement. 
•  When the financing company believes the continuation of the research collaboration 
would be “unwise.” 
Note that, in theory, the second termination criterion differs from the others. When a party 
terminates because of “breach” a court may later find it to be the actual breaching party. With the 
other two termination provisions, this is almost impossible; no court would second-guess a firm's 
decision to terminate because continuing was “unwise.” As a practical matter, however, the 
termination right for “material breach” enables the terminating party to move forward with 
various self-help remedies unless and until the other party goes to court to litigate the issue. In 
addition, the burden is then on the non-terminating party to show the termination was not 
justified. Thus, these provisions give the terminating party the right to act unilaterally. Especially   25
                                                
when the other party is a cash-constrained biotechnology company, it is practically the equivalent 
of an open-ended termination right like the first and third ones listed.
17 
As noted in Table 1, termination rights appear to be a widespread feature of contracts. In 
almost all contracts some kind of termination right is specified (97.7%) and is assigned to the 
financing company or both parties (96.7%). More than half of those termination rights are 
conditional on specific events, while about 39% of the research agreements have provisions for 
the financing firm to terminate the collaboration unconditionally. In 11%, the financing firm has 
both termination rights and broad access to the intellectual property after the termination of the 
agreement.  
As the theory above suggests, we are interested in contractual provisions that exclude the 
R&D company from retaining all the value generated during the collaboration if the research 
collaboration is terminated. This is the case when the intellectual property rights revert to the 
financing company. Arguably, patents and other intellectual property rights are worth less in the 
hands of the financing company, and thus should be always assigned to the R&D company if the 
collaboration is successful. However, the threat of reversion enables the financing company to 
ensure profit-maximizing research efforts on the part of the R&D researchers. We identify all 
situations where the financing company retains rights to the intellectual property employed in the 
research alliance after its termination. The interaction between this dummy variable and the four-
part measure of termination rights will be the primary dependent variable in our analysis. 
  We construct the dependent variable in several ways. We use both a simple binary 
variable, which takes the value of one if the financing company has at least one unconditional 
termination right (along with broadened rights), and a more refined integer variable, which 
accounts for the number of termination rights of the financing company. In the latter case the 
dependent variable takes on measures from zero to +3. Furthermore, in light of alternative 
explanations for the right to terminate, both on the side of the financing company and the R&D 
company, we consider only cases where the financing company has the right to terminate (with 
broad rights) and the R&D company has no right to terminate (with or without broadened rights). 
Again, we construct both the simple binary variable, which takes the value of one if the financing 
company has at least one termination right and the R&D company has none, and as well as 
integer variables with values from –3 to +3, counting the “net” termination rights of the financing 
company minus those of the R&D company. All approaches deliver approximately the same 
results. 
We begin by testing Prediction 1. We examine the extent to which projects without a 
contractible lead product candidate at the time the research agreement is signed are more likely to 
 
17 For a discussion of some of these issues in a recent licensing case, see Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Baldwin Piano 
Inc. v. Deutsche Wurlitzer GmbH, 73 USPQ2d 1375 (CA 7 2004).   26
grant the financing company the right to terminate the collaboration while obtaining broad access 
to the intellectual property involved.  
In Table 2, we present a series of cross-tabulations. In Panel A, we undertake simple 
univariate comparisons. When there is no specifiable lead product candidate at the time the 
alliance is signed, the agreement is significantly more likely to assign termination and broad 
rights to the financing firm. This is also likely to be the case when the agreement is between two 
biotechnology firms.  
In Panel B, we undertake a series of cross-tabulations. We show that the differences 
between projects where there is no specifiable lead product is only statistically significant when 
the firm is ranked above the median of biotechnology firms in terms of underwriter reputation, 
the agreement is between two biotechnology firms, and the R&D firm’s financial condition is 
below the median. As we will argue below, these results are consistent with theoretical 
predictions. 
We now turn to econometric analyses. The baseline regression analysis is reported in 
Table 3. We employ a variety of control variables: 
•  We are concerned that there may be a time trend in the transactions, so we control for the 
date of the agreement. In the initial regressions, we employ a continuous date variable; in 
supplemental regressions, we use dummy variables for each year. 
•  Diagnostic and veterinary products are likely to face a substantially different information 
environment from therapeutic products. Not only are the scientific uncertainties often 
significantly reduced for a diagnostic product, but also the regulatory hurdles for both 
classes of products are considerably reduced. 
•  The cross-subsidization problems may be more severe if the biotechnology firm holds 
large number of patents, indicating numerous related research avenues. We identify in 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office databases all patent awards to the biotechnology firm 
at the time the alliance is signed. 
•  Capital constraints may affect the transactions that the parties reach. In the baseline 
regression, we control for the amount of time the firm has until it runs out of cash. In 
particular, we take the absolute value of the ratio of the firm’s current cash flow to its 
cash in hand (“cash burn rate”). If the firm has positive cash flow, we code this measure 
as zero. A higher value implies that it is sooner until the firm runs out of money. 
•  Previous research agreements may ease the contracting between the two firms. In 
particular, the reputational capital that the two parties built up in previous alliances may 
allow firms to overcome problems that would be difficult to contract around if the parties 
suspected each other of being opportunistic.   27
                                                
The table presents a number of regressions, which use some or all of these independent variables. 
In addition, we employ both ordinary least squares and ordered logit specifications, which may 
better reflect the ordinal, non-negative nature of the dependent variable. Finally, we employ fixed 
effects for each year instead of the continuous date variable. 
Across the reported regressions—and the many dozens of similar though unreported 
analyses—we find a consistent pattern. Research collaborations that encounter considerable 
contracting difficulties at the time that the transaction is signed are associated with a substantial 
boost in the probability of broadened property rights and termination rights being assigned to the 
financing firm. This result is not only statistically, but also economically significant: the average 
coefficient across the four ordinary least squares regressions of 0.11 is significant relative to the 
mean of the dependent variable (0.15).
18 
A natural concern in this analysis has to do with endogeneity. For instance, a major issue 
affecting the entire empirical literature on (research) alliances is the (endogenous) choice to enter 
an alliance. The pharmaceutical companies entering into research alliances are likely to be 
different from those not entering alliances. These differences may affect the observed contract 
design. While there is no obvious reason why the endogenous entry decision would affect the 
empirical results reported above, we attempt to address at least part of the selection issue. In 
particular, we would like to make sure that our results are not driven by endogenous matching 
between low-ability research types and pharmaceutical companies who (opportunistically) insist 
on termination rights.  
To address this possibility, we employ fixed effects for the 13 most frequently 
represented pharmaceutical companies in Table 4, thus holding the type of pharmaceutical 
companies constant. When we employ a variety of specifications, we still find a consistently 
strong relationship between the difficulty of contracting and the assignment of termination and 
broad intellectual property rights to the financing firm. The addition of the pharmaceutical 
company dummy variables has little impact on the other coefficients. These results suggest that, 
for a given pharmaceutical company, the variation in termination and reversion rights is indeed 
related to the research program. The results also alleviate partly the larger endogeneity concerns 
pointed out before. The occurrence of different types of contracts within the same pharmaceutical 
firm ensure that our results are not driven by the fact that certain types of companies only enter 






2 is comparable to other empirical studies analyzing non-standardized contracts, Robinson and Stuart (2004). 
19 In unreported analyses, we repeat the regressions, clustering the standard errors in the analyses by pharmaceutical 
company. This modification has little impact on the results.    28
Additional predictions 
We now turn to examining the two additional predictions of our theory, relating to the impact of 
financial constraints and outside options. 
 
Financial constraints. We first test Prediction 2 and examine the impact of financial constraints 
on the contract design. As noted in the introduction, our paper—in a manner similar to Aghion 
and Tirole (1994)—suggests that the financial constraints of the biotechnology firm (the research 
unit, in their parlance) may preclude arriving at the first-best outcome. We should thus anticipate 
that the relationship between the assignment of termination and broad intellectual property rights 
to the larger firm and a non-contractible lead product candidate should be stronger among 
financially constrained firms.  
The assumption that the biotechnology company faces financial constraints, implicit in 
the above theoretical analysis, is certainly appropriate for the vast majority of biotechnology 
companies. Our sample of biotechnology firms is peculiar, however, in that many firms have 
undergone an initial public offering and are thus relatively large and established firms. As a 
result, many of the biotechnology firms in our sample are not subject to financial constraints to 
the same extent as a typical biotechnology start-up company. Since the systematic correlation 
between the assignment of termination and revision rights to the financing firm and a non-
contractible lead product candidate depends on the presence of financial constraints, we now test 
whether this dependence is borne out in the data: i.e., whether our results are driven by contracts 
with those biotechnology firms that are (most) financially constrained. 
To identify biotechnology firms that are capital constrained, we employ several simple 
approaches. In the reported regressions in Table 5, we divide the firms based on their net income 
in the year prior to the research collaboration being formed and cash and equivalents at the end of 
that year. (We employed a similar approach in the cross-tabulations reported in Table 2, which 
corroborated the predicted pattern.)  Cases where the biotechnology firm has net income or 
revenue above and below that of the median firm (in 2002 dollars) are considered separately. We 
find that consistent with our hypothesis, firms that are below the median along these measures are 
the only ones that display a statistically significant relationship between the provisions of broad 
intellectual property and termination rights to the financing firm and projects that are especially 
difficult to contract upon. In research alliances where the parties were above the median on these 
measures, the coefficient on this variable is roughly half the size and not statistically significant. 
In unreported regressions, we explored the robustness of these results to other divisions 
of the firms. In this analysis, our choice of the median to divide firms was somewhat arbitrary: it 
is not obvious where capital constraints will become severely binding. It appeared that the results 
became even sharper when we isolated even more extremely constrained subsets of firms. For   29
                                                
instance, the differences are more dramatic when we employ the bottom quartile of firms in terms 
of net income and cash and equivalents.  
 
Outside options. We then turn to testing whether higher ex-post outside options of the 
pharmaceutical company in case it owns the patents make the option contract more attractive, and 
thus more frequently employed in contractually difficult environments. We hypothesize that, 
while pharmaceutical companies are less likely to gain from broader rights – all they are 
interested in is the license to the specific product allowing for production and sales – other 
biotechnology firms may benefit more from these rights. Those biotechnology companies that 
have grown large and enter research collaborations with other (typically much smaller) 
biotechnology companies in the role of the financing parties are likely to have more research 
capacity to use the patents for future projects, even without the collaboration of the original 
contract partners. In terms of the model, α is likely to be large. 
We thus split up our sample into research agreements between a pharmaceutical company 
and a biotechnology company and those between two biotechnology firms. Our data set contains 
77 cases of research agreements between biotechnology companies and 453 cases of research 
agreements between a biotechnology and a pharmaceutical company.
20 We rerun the regression of 
Table 3 on those two sub-samples (Table 6). We find that the effect of a non-specifiable lead 
product on option contract design is much larger and, despite the smaller sample size, 
considerably more precisely estimated in the sample of contracts between biotechnology firms. 
This result—which is consistent once again with the cross-tabulations in Table 2—confirms 
Prediction 3 of our model. 
In Table 7, we take another approach, estimating pooled regressions that include all 
observations. We first repeat the financial constraints analysis. We include separate dummy 
variables for R&D firms that are above and below the median net income, as well as interactions 
between these dummies and an indicator of whether there was no specifiable lead product 
candidate at the time the research agreement was signed. Only the interaction term indicating 
projects where the R&D firm is financially constrained and the project is not specifiable proves to 
be significantly positive. 
In the second column of Table 7, we repeat the analysis in Table 6, now pooling the 
observations. We again employ dummy variables for agreements that are and are not between two 
biotechnology firms, as well as interactions with an indicator of whether there is a no specified 
 
20In the regressions in Table 5, the sample size in one regression is always relatively modest (either due to the low 
number of biotechnology-biotechnology agreements or the “lumpiness” in the underwriter rank measure). As a result, 
we estimate these regressions without three of the additional control variables. The results are quite similar, however, 
when we do employ these controls, though the sample size shrinks considerably.    30
lead product candidate at the time of the signing of the agreement. Once again, only the 
coefficient on the variable denoting the agreements between biotechnologies companies without a 
specified lead product candidate proves to be statistically significant. 
 
Alternative explanations 
Our proxy for contractibility is, naturally, noisy and leaves room for a number of alternative 
explanations. In this section, we consider what we believe to be the three main alternative 
interpretations of the observed contract design. 
 
Research abilities of the biotechnology company. The contract design may be related to 
uncertainty or asymmetric information about the “type” of the biotechnology company. When 
entering the research collaboration, the financing company cannot perfectly assess the abilities of 
the biotechnology researchers with respect to the joint project and the chances of a successful 
collaboration. Termination rights allow the financing company to end the relationship as soon as 
it has recognized the biotechnology partner to have relatively low ability. For this story to explain 
our results, the “unspecified lead product” variable would need to capture higher uncertainty 
about research abilities or collaboration success.  
For two reasons, however, this adverse-selection story is an unlikely explanation for the 
observed variations in contract design. First, we attempt to control for the research abilities 
directly. To do this, we examine the underwriter who took the biotechnology firms public. We 
anticipate that those firms that went public with the highest quality underwriters are likely to be 
higher quality than those that did not. Following previous literature, we use a Carter-Manaster 
(1990) style score to proxy for underwriter reputation. Table 3 indicated already that our results 
are independent of this control. In addition, we run separate regressions for firms ranked above 
and below the median on their Carter-Manaster (1990) score. We find in Table 8 that the effects 
are much stronger among the high-quality firms, i.e., among the biotechnology firms that went 
public with the best underwriters. (Again, this result is consistent with the cross-tabulations 
above.)  The result runs against the alternative hypothesis delineated above. If the difficulty of 
discerning the R&D firm’s type were the critical consideration behind the use of these provisions, 
we might anticipate that the relationship between the assignment of termination and broader 
intellectual property rights to the financing firm and difficulty of contracting would be instead 
stronger among the lower-reputation firms. Moreover, the above-median firms are not only likely 
to have higher abilities and better prospects, but should also benefit from the “certification” of 
their research abilities that is implicit in the underwriter quality. The high reputation rank of their 
underwriter should thus reduce the uncertainty about their “type” and render the termination and   31
                                                
broader access rights more dispensable. The empirical results of Table 3 suggest, however, that 
these considerations do not trigger the analyzed contractual clauses.
21 
Second, this story lacks a reason why the pharmaceutical company should also want to 
obtain broader rights. Quite to the contrary, intellectual property produced by “low research 
types” is likely to be least attractive to the pharmaceutical company. In other words, for this 
alternative explanation to hold, our results would need to be driven by the termination right, and 
not by the broad intellectual property rights. To distinguish between this alternative and the 
incomplete-contracts hypothesis, we repeat the analysis above, now using a dummy denoting 
whether the pharmaceutical company has the right to terminate the agreement (again coded as 0 
to +3) as the dependent variable, but without the interaction with the measure of broad 
intellectual property rights. We find in the first four columns of Table 9 that under various 
specifications, the difficulty of contracting has no significant impact on the assignment of 
termination rights by themselves.  
 
Variations in uncertainty, informational asymmetry, or incentive misalignment. The 
contractibility hypothesis put forward in this paper builds on misaligned research incentives and 
non-contractibility of research effort. We attribute the variation in contractual termination and 
reversion clauses to variations in contractibility, holding incentive conflicts, informational 
asymmetry, monitoring costs, etc. constant. Alternatively, variations in the latter variables may 
determine the implementation of termination and reversion rights. For instance, the parties may 
employ termination and broad intellectual property rights whenever they are facing higher 
uncertainty about the outcome, or whenever the informational asymmetry between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology company is higher, or whenever the incentive conflict between 
the parties is higher. Any of these alternative suggestions would build on a model where 
termination and broad rights help to solve the incentive problem, but do so at a cost. The cost may 
be lower profit extraction for the pharmaceutical company (due to financial constraints of the 
biotechnology firm). Or it may be the risk of opportunistic exercise of the termination right on the 
side of the pharmaceutical company. Then, the termination and broader rights are employed only 
if the incentive problem is “severe enough,” i.e., if uncertainty, informational asymmetry, or the 
incentive misalignment are big enough. 
Before we present additional results that attempt to distinguish between the alternative 
explanations and our hypothesis, it is noteworthy that all of these stories need contractual 
incompleteness as a key ingredient. If the parties could write contracts on the exact action to be 
 
21 While these results allow us to reject the alternative hypothesis, they raise the question as to why this relationship 
should be stronger among the high-quality firms. One possibility is that the observations of firms with lower-quality 
underwriters are much noisier. Endogenous selection may lead to only “safe” (contractible) cases being contracted.   32
                                                
taken by the biotechnology researchers or condition on all possible outcomes, termination rights 
would not be employed since they come at a cost relative to writing complete contracts. Thus, 
even under these alternative explanations our results provide evidence on the impact of contract 
design when actions or outcomes are non-contractible. 
However, additional empirical results cast some doubt on these alternative hypotheses. 
One first indicator that variations in uncertainty or informational asymmetry are unlikely to drive 
all of our results is the regressions that control for the type of research program (therapeutic, 
diagnostic, and veterinary). As noted above, the scientific and regulatory uncertainty is 
substantially higher for the development of therapeutic products. Nevertheless, we do not find a 
consistent, significantly positive correlation between the termination and reversion clauses and 
therapeutic products. Moreover, even if we eliminate undesired heterogeneity in uncertainty and 
we examine only agreements focusing on therapeutic products, our baseline results go through as 
before, with a coefficient of 0.11 (and a standard error of 0.05)
22  
What may be related to uncertainty and informational asymmetry is the termination right 
per se, not bundled with broad intellectual property rights. In the first four columns of Table 9, 
where we analyze “termination rights only” as the dependent variable, we find no relation 
between unspecified lead product candidate and termination rights. However, we also find that 
termination rights are negatively related to diagnostic and veterinary products. To the extent that 
the parties face less uncertainty with these types of products or less informational asymmetry 
about the prospects of the research program, the table indicates that other types of termination 
clauses may well be driven by variations in uncertainty. At the same time, these “non-results” 
help us feel comfortable that the results on the termination rights with broadened rights do not 
simply stem from the fact that the pharmaceutical company just learns the type of the 
biotechnology company over time. 
In the last two columns of Table 9, we also undertake a regression analysis employing 
specified termination provisions: that is, those triggered by distinct events. We focus on four 
classes of provisions: those triggered by the bankruptcy of one of the firms, change in control of 
one of the firms, the termination of another agreement by one or both of the parties, and other 
pre-specified events. As before, we employ as the dependent variable the interaction between a 
count of the number of provisions present (between zero and four) and a dummy variable that 
takes on the value one if intellectual property reverts (at least in part) to the financing firm. Since 
our predictions are specific to the combination of unconditional termination rights and broad 
 
22When we focus on diagnostic and veterinary products, however, there is no meaningful relationship between the 
difficulty of contracting and the assignment of termination and broad intellectual property rights to the financing firm. 
The latter result may either be due to the small sample size (less than one-fifth of the observations fall into either of 
these categories) or because researchers of the pharmaceutical company can closely monitor and direct the research 
activities.   33
intellectual property rights, we would like to make sure that not “any” of the other termination 
rights, combined with broader rights, have a similar correlation with the nature of the research 
program. 
The results are quite different from those in the earlier tables. In transactions without a 
specified lead product at the time the agreement is signed, there is no significant tendency for 
these termination and reversion rights to be more frequently assigned to the financing firm. This 
result is again consistent with our hypothesis: the termination and broad intellectual property 
rights are a substitute for conditional contracting. 
The above results address uncertainty and informational asymmetry. As mentioned 
before, one may also attribute the correlation between termination rights with broader access to 
the intellectual property and lead-product specification to variations in the degree of incentive 
conflict. In other words, research programs with an unspecified lead product candidate are more 
likely to imply different research interests than those for which the parties have agreed on a 
candidate. Based on our conversations with practitioners, however, the opposite appears to be the 
case. A biotechnology company that enters a research agreement with a pre-specified and 
potentially even tested product candidate is more likely to be involved in parallel research 
collaborations and simultaneous, related research projects, increasing rather than decreasing the 
scope for project cross-subsidization. In other words, while it is harder to control project cross-
subsidization in research collaborations without a specified lead product candidate, the prospect 
for cross-subsidization may in fact be smaller.  
 
Bargaining power. Another alternative explanation for the contracting pattern analyzed above is 
the relative bargaining power of the two parties. Biotechnology firms without well-developed and 
thus specifiable products may be less able to resist the demands of prospective partners for strong 
control rights. 
We cannot observe the bargaining power of the two parties, and thus cannot reject this 
possibility with absolute certainty. We believe that the evidence presented above, however, is 
inconsistent with this alternative explanation. Most convincing is the analysis presented in Table 
3 (and in similar unreported regressions). If unobserved differences in bargaining power were 
behind the seeming importance of the “No specifiable lead product at the time of the signing of 
the research agreement” variable, then we would anticipate that the addition of more control 
variables would lead to the coefficient’s magnitude and significance falling. Control variables, 
such as the number of patents of the biotechnology firm, its financial strength, and the number of 
other research alliances, should at least partially capture variations in the bargaining power of the 
biotechnology company, and thereby reduce the partial correlation between the “No specifiable 
lead product” variable and the unobserved bargaining power. However, quite the opposite occurs:   34
as we add independent variables that should be correlated with bargaining power, the magnitude 
and significance of the “No specifiable lead product” actually increases. This pattern continues to 
hold when we add independent variables measuring the biotechnology firm’s financial condition 
and patent holdings in greater detail, as well as the financing environment for biotechnology 
firms more generally. The failure of these variables to reduce the explanatory power of the key 
independent variable leads us to reject this alternative explanation.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Overall, the empirical evidence on contract design in biotechnology research agreements provides 
an example of firms reacting to limited contractibility by designing decision rights and combining 
these with payments conditional on the exercise of the decision right. Our approach differs from 
the previous empirical literature following the property-rights approach in that we focus on a 
property right different from the allocation of asset ownership; in fact, it appears, that the parties 
endogenously “generate” a decision right to solve the problem of contractual incompleteness. 
At the same time, part of the contribution of this paper is that we shed light on the nature 
of the incentive and contracting problem in research alliances, in particular the problem of project 
substitution or project cross-subsidization. Moreover, we provide new details on the contractual 
design in research agreements, which are consistent with the theory proposed in this paper, but 
which also may be of interest for a better understanding of inter-firm organizations. 
To be sure, the right to terminate is only one of a complex array of decision rights 
inherent in research collaborations. Moreover, there may well be other empirical approaches to 
testing the theoretical hypotheses in this paper: for instance, examining the shifting terms of 
agreements that are renegotiated. But the analysis suggests the promise of combining theoretical 
and empirical approaches to understanding contract design. Appendix A. Notation of Model 
 
R  Research company (typically biotechnology company) 
F  Financing company (typically pharmaceutical company) 
t  Time period in the model (0, 1, 2 and 3) 
I  Initial investment, required to generate any research surplus 
eN  “Narrow” research effort by R 
eB  “Broad” research effort by R 
N  Expected narrow surplus, i.e., profits from product targeted in the collaboration. 
N   High value of expected narrow surplus, resulting from narrow research effort. 
N   Low value of expected narrow surplus, resulting from broad research effort. 
B  Expected broad surplus, i.e., profits from other products and, for R, value of entering 
collaborations with other firms.  
B  High value of expected broad surplus, resulting from broad research effort. 
B  Low value of expected broad surplus, resulting from narrow research effort. 
ε Share  of  B that F can capture if it has the rights for the broad research. 
α Share  of  N that F can capture without the collaboration of the original research 
partner R if F has the rights for the narrow research. 
pT Payment  from  F to R conditional on termination 
pC Payment  from  F to R conditional on continuation 
∆  B N ε α − − ) 1 (  
Γ  B N ε α − − ) 1 (  
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Proof of Lemma 4. 
We consider separately option contracts with i = F and with i = R. For the class of all option 
contracts with i=F, we first show that F’s payoff  O Π  from any option contract that does not both 
(i) induce continuation in equilibrium and (ii) allocate at least the narrow rights to F after 
continuation is weakly smaller than   or strictly smaller than  . 
*
NO Π O Π ˆ
For the set of contracts violating (i), i.e., inducing termination in equilibrium, we distinguish four 
cases. 
If  ∅, then   (given  ).  = T o
* 0 NO T O I p Π ≤ < − − = Π 0 ≥ T p
If  , then  B oT = I p B T O − − = Π ε where R’s participation constraint implies  B pT ≥ and 
thus (with A.3)  . 
* 0 NO O Π ≤ < Π
If  , then  .  N oT = O T O I N I p N Π < − ≤ − − = Π ˆ α α
If  , then  B N oT + = I p B N T O − − + = Π ε α  where R’s participation constraint implies 
B pT ≥  and thus (with A.3)  .  O O I N Π < − < Π ˆ α
For the set of contracts satisfying (i) but violating (ii), i.e. inducing continuation in equilibrium 
but not allocation of the narrow rights to F, we distinguish two cases. 
If  ∅, then  .  = C o
* 0 NO C O I p Π ≤ ≤ − − = Π
If  , then  B oC = I p B C O − − = Π ε , where R’s participation constraint implies  B pC ≥  
and thus  . 
* 0 NO O Π ≤ < Π
This leaves two types of contracts, which satisfy both (i) and (ii): contracts inducing continuation 
and allocating both broad and narrow rights to F after continuation  ) ( N B oC + = , and contracts 
inducing continuation and granting narrow rights after continuation  ) ( N oC = . Contracts with 
, however, have to satisfy the following four constraints: (a) The participation 
constraint for R is 
B N oC + =
B pC ≥ . (b) The incentive-compatibility constraint ensuring that F continues 
after R exerted   is  N e















(c) The contract also needs to satisfy incentive-compatibility for F to terminate after  . 
Otherwise R would choose   instead of  , given A.1. 
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(d) The incentive-compatibility constraint ensuring that R chooses   is  N e
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In these cases, the maximization problem of F amounts to minimizing pC under the above 
participation constraint and incentive compatibility conditions. We can characterize the optimal 
 (if it exists) as follows: 
*
C p
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It is easy to check that the payoff  I p B N C O − − + = Π
* ε  is smaller than   in all four cases, 




It remains to be shown that contracts with  N oC =  but  B N oT + ≠  do not yield a higher or equal 
payoff for F than the contract considered in Lemma 2 ( B N o N o T C + = = , ). Note first that 
 implies that the participation constraint for R is not binding since R receives the broad 
surplus. The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that F continues after   is 
N oC =
N e




) 1 ( α
ε
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if oT = ∅ 
if oT = B 
if oT = N 
if oT = B+N 
for oT = ∅ 
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for oT = N 
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for oT = ∅ 
for oT = B 
for oT = N 
for oT= B+N 
for oT = ∅ 
for oT = B 
for oT = N 
The contract needs to induce F to terminate if R chooses  ; otherwise R would choose   over 
 and receive 
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and the incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that R chooses   is      N e
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The resulting conditions for existence are 
    < − B B  
N
N
) 1 ( α −
     
In these cases or for oT = B, the maximization problem of F amounts to minimizing pC under the 
above pC incentive compatibility constraints and yields the solution 
      =
*
C p











if  oT = ∅ 
if  oT = B 
if  oT = N 
if  oT = ∅ 
if  oT = N 
for oT = ∅ 
for oT = B 
for oT = N 
and the resulting payoff  I p N C O − − = Π
*  is smaller than   in all three cases.    O Π ˆ
Thus, we have shown that there is no option contract with i = F and a payoff   such that 
 and  .            
O Π
*
NO O Π > Π O O Π ≥ Π ˆ
Finally, consider the class of contracts where R has the right to terminate. Contracts that do not (i) 
induce continuation in equilibrium and (ii) allocate narrow rights to F after continuation are ruled 
out the same way as for i = R. Further, contracts satisfying (i) and (ii) allocate at least narrow 
rights after continuation and will thus always induce R to choose eB  since R ’s payoff after 
continuation if choosing   is always weakly (for N e B N oC + = ) or strictly (for ) smaller 
than if choosing  . However the maximum payoff resulting from any contract inducing R to 
choose eB  is  . Thus, there is also no option contract with i = R and payoff   satisfying 




NO Π O Π
*
NO O Π > Π O O Π ≥ Π ˆ
 
Appendix C. Renegotiation 
The results in Section III have been derived under the assumption that the parties can commit not 
to renegotiate. We now allow for renegotiation of the original contract after period 1. As in 
Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995), we assume that, at one point in time between periods 1 and 2, both 
R and F can send signed offers to each other, specifying new prices   and   as well as a new 
(conditional) allocation of property rights. After F has decided whether to continue or to 
C p ~
T p ~terminate at time 2, the parties can both present any signed offer they received in court. The court 
can observe whether F initiated termination or not and will enforce the respective payment as 
specified in the original contract unless 
  exactly one party presents a signed renegotiation offer from the other party to the court 
  both sides present the same renegotiation offer to the court.  
In those two cases, the court enforces the renegotiated contract. We assume that 
 
(A.5) R and F are willing to accept the best renegotiation offer received from the other party if 
their own equilibrium payoff in the continuation game (after t = 1) under the renegotiated contract 
is weakly larger than the equilibrium payoff under the original contract. They are willing to make 
a renegotiation offer if their renegotiated equilibrium payoff in the continuation game is strongly 
larger than the original equilibrium payoff. 
 
For example, if R exerts eB and F does not send any signed offers to R but R sends a 
signed offer, F will accept R’s offer if the resulting equilibrium allocation of surplus to F is at 
least as high as the equilibrium payoff under the original contract. We apply the concept of sub 
game-perfect equilibrium. Given this renegotiation mechanism, we can specify when the contract 
derived in Lemma 2 is renegotiation-proof. 
 
Lemma 5. For ∆ ≥ 0, contracts in ÂO are not renegotiation-proof. For ∆ < 0, contracts in ÂO 
with   are renegotiation-proof.  ∆ − < T p
Proof. We first determine in which subgames, after R has chosen e, renegotiation may occur. In 
any subgame following effort choice eN, the original contract allows for extraction of the full 
surplus, with expected value  B N + . Any reallocation is either a mere transfer or reduces the total 
surplus. Both parties can guarantee themselves the payoff resulting from the original contract by 
not making any renegotiation offers and not presenting any offers they receive. Thus, there is no 
scope for renegotiation. In any subgame following effort choice eB, the surplus under the original 
contract,  B N ε α + , is smaller than the surplus that can be extracted if F does not terminate. 
Hence, there is scope for renegotiation-inducing continuation. (Since the original contract 
recommends termination in the sub-game, any other contract that leads to termination is a mere 
transfer.) 
We now show that a necessary condition for R to exert eB and for subsequent renegotiation to 
succeed after eB is that R offers a new contract. Suppose, instead, that R exerts eB, but does not 
make a renegotiation offer. If F makes an offer, F will allocate an equilibrium continuation 
  39payoff of exactly pT to R since this suffices to induce R to accept the offer (with A.5). 
Anticipating this, R will exert eN instead of eB to ensure a renegotiation-proof payoff of 
} , 0 max{ ∆ + = + B p B C , which is strictly larger than pT for all subcases specified in Lemma 2. 
This contradicts the initial assumption that R exerts eB. Successful renegotiation thus requires R to 
make an offer. 
With assumption A.5, two conditions need to be satisfied to induce R to choose eB and to make a 
renegotiation offer upon which F continues and which F would enforce: 
1. Conditional  on  R choosing eB, F’s payoff after continuation and enforcing R’s renegotiation 
offer is weakly higher than F’s payoff after termination and enforcing the original contract. 
2. Given  F’s equilibrium strategies in the continuation games, R’s payoff after eB and 
continuation under the renegotiated contract is strictly higher than after eN and continuation 
under the original contract. 
We consider separately renegotiation offers that (re-)assign (i) both broad and narrow rights and 
(ii) only narrow rights to F upon continuation. 
(i)  Broad and narrow rights. In order to accept R’s renegotiation offer and to choose 
continuation, F requires a continuation payoff  C p B N ~ − +ε  that is weakly higher than the 
continuation payoff after termination under the original contract,  T p B N − +ε α . The 
resulting upper bound of   is  C p ~
T C p N p + − ≤ ) 1 ( ~ α . Thus, R can at most ensure a payoff of 
T p N + − ) 1 ( α  instead of  C p B +  under the original contract. It is easy to check that, for all 
three subcases specified in Lemma 2, R’s continuation payoff under the original contract is 
strictly higher. Hence, R will not choose eB and then make a renegotiation offer allocating 
both the narrow and the broad rights to F in case of continuation. 
(ii) Narrow rights. F accepts R’s renegotiation offer and chooses continuation if the continuation 
payoff  C p N ~ −  is weakly higher than the continuation payoff after termination under the 
original contract,  T p B N − +ε α , i. e. if  T C p B N p + − − ≤ ε α) 1 ( ~ . 
For ∆ < 0, we can find such a   only if the original pT was set equal to –∆ (given the non-
negativity constraint). Thus, by choosing pT < – ∆ (within the ranges specified in Lemma 2), 
F avoids renegotiation, induces R to exert eN, and obtains the resulting higher payoff. 
C p ~
For ∆ ≥ 0, any   satisfies the above condition and the non-negativity constraint. 
Conditional on having chosen eB,  R  will thus make a renegotiation offer, proposing the 
highest possible  , i.e., 
] , 0 [ ~ ∆ ∈ C p
C p ~ ∆ = C p ~ , and receive  ∆ + B . Moreover, R prefers choosing eB and 
renegotiating to choosing eN, since  ∆ + > ∆ + B B . Q.E.D. 
 
  40Lemma 5 immediately implies that for ∆ < 0,  where   (Lemma 3), F will offer a 
contract from the set ÂO  with 
* ˆ
NO O Π > Π
∆ − < T p . Similarly, for  } , max{ I N N − ≥ ∆ , where   
(Lemma 3), F will offer a (renegotiation-proof) contract from the set  . It remains to be shown 
which contract generates the highest payoff for F in the range 
* ˆ
NO O Π ≤ Π
*
NO A
} , max{ 0 I N N − < ∆ ≤ . We focus 
on the choice between renegotiation-proof contracts in   and option contracts (F, pC, pT, N, 





the maximum of  B N ε α + ,  N , and I, i.e.,  } , , max{
~
I N B N ε α + = ∆ . 
Using Lemma 5, we can summarize F’s contractual choice as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. If ∆ < 0, F implements any option contract in ÂO with pT < –∆ and obtains payoff 
I N O − = Π ˆ .  If  ) (
~
0 B B N − − ∆ − < ∆ ≤ , F implements the option contract  F i = ( , 
∆ + − = B B pC ,  0 = T p ,  ,  N oC = ) B N oT + = and obtains payoff  I B B N O − ∆ − − − = Π ) (
~ . If 
∆ < − − ∆ − ≤ ) (
~




} 0 , max{
* I N NO − = Π . 
 
Proof.  For  ∆  <  0, any contract in ÂO maximizes F’s payoff under the assumption of no 
renegotiation (Lemma 3). The subset of contracts with pT < –∆ are renegotiation-proof (Lemma 
5). Since renegotiation reduces F’s payoff, F will choose a contract with pT < –∆, resulting in 
payoff  I N O − = Π ˆ . 




} 0 , max{
* I N NO − = Π . 
For  } , max{ 0 I N N − < ∆ ≤ ,   (Lemma 3) but no option contract in ÂO is renegotiation-
proof (Lemma 5). We analyze whether F will implement a contract in   or an option contract 
(F, pC, pT, N, N + B) that satisfies (1). We first compare   to the maximum payoff F can 
obtain from option contracts that are not
* ˆ





 renegotiation-proof. We then compare   to the 




For both cases note that for any option contract (F, pC, pT, N, N + B) with prices pC and pT 
satisfying (1), R can find a price   such that, conditional on R having chosen eB, F accepts the 




  41for which  C T p N p B N ~ − ≤ − +ε α , i. e.  ] , 0 [ ~
T C p p + ∆ ∈ . Whether R chooses eB and renegotiation 
over eN and the original contract, depends on the original prices (pC, pT). R prefers eB (and the 
contract is thus not renegotiation-proof) iff  C C p B p B ~ + < +  for some  ] , 0 [ ~
T C p p + ∆ ∈ . 
Substituting  , we can rewrite the condition as  T C p p + ∆ = ~
T C p B B p + ∆ + − < . 
Consider now the first the case (contracts that are not renegotiation-proof), i. e., option contracts 
(F, pC, pT, N, N + B) satisfying (1) and  T C p B B p + ∆ + − < . F’s payoff from implementing such 
a contract, after renegotiation, amounts to  I p N I p N T C − − ∆ − = − − ~ , which is weakly smaller 
than  I B N − +ε α and thus weakly smaller than   for any pT in the range 
*
NO Π
} , max{ 0 I N N − < ∆ ≤ . Hence, F will not implement this type of option contract. 
Consider now the second case (contracts that are renegotiation-proof), i.  e., option contracts 
satisfying  T C p B B p + ∆ + − ≥ . F can find prices (pC, pT) satisfying both this inequality and (1) iff 
Γ < − + ∆ B B , i.  e.  ) ( ) ( B B B N N − − + − < ∆ ε α . Given any option contract satisfying these 
conditions,  R will exert eN and not renegotiate. The resulting payoff for F,  I p N C − −  is 
maximized by setting  ∆ + − = B B pC  and  0 = T p . F prefers this option contract over a contract 
in   if 
*
NO A } 0 , max{ ) ( I N I B B N − > − ∆ − − − , i. e. if  ) ( } , max{ B B I N N − − − < ∆ . We can thus 
summarize as follows: For  ) ( } , , max{ 0 B B I N B N N − − + − < ∆ ≤ ε α , F chooses option contract 
(F,  ∆ + − B B , 0, N, N + B) and obtains payoff  I B B N O − ∆ − − − = Π ) (
~
.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 2 shows that renegotiation may reduce the range over which an option contract with 
termination rights and reversion of intellectual property is optimal (namely if 
) ( ) ( B B B N N − − + − < ∆ ε α ). The basic finding, however, remains the same: the option 
contract is optimal for small   and thus for high α and ε. The intuition is that large outside 
options of the financing company correspond to a lower the value of R’s cooperation in the 
development phase. As a result, it is less costly for F to induce R to exert eN , and the option 
contract becomes more profitable. 
∆
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 Figure 2.  Table of Payoff
 
 
 IP  Rights  F’s payoff  R’s payoff 
oC = ∅  – pC B + pC
oC = N  N– pC B + pC
oC = B  εB– pC pC
Continuation 
oC = N + B  N + εB– pC pC
oT = ∅  – pT B + pT
oT = N  αN – pT B + pT
oT = B  εB – pT pT
Termination 
oT = N + B  αN + εB – pT pT
 
 





















































 Table 1.  Summary statistics.  The sample consists of 584 research agreements entered into between 
biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing 
companies”).  Date of agreement is coded as year plus one twelfth of the month in which the agreement is signed.  
The Carter-Manaster rank is the rating of the leading underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering ratings 
as compiled by Carter and Manaster [1990], Carter, Dark, and Singh [1998], and Ritter [2003].  The “cash burn 
rate” is the absolute value of the ratio of cash flow over cash and equivalents of the R&D firm. 
 
  Mean Stan.  Dev. Min. Max. 
Date of agreement  1995.3  3.7  1980  2001 
Length of agreement (years)  3.9  3.2  0.9  31.0 
Carter-Manaster rank of R&D firm’s IPO lead underwriter  7.7  2.0  1.0  9.0 
No specifiable lead product candidate at signing of research agreement  37.5%    0  1 
Agreement involves diagnostic product  13.0%    0  1 
Agreement involves veterinary product  5.3%    0  1 
Agreement between two biotechnology firms  15.1%    0  1 
Total patents of R&D firm at signing of research agreement  8.6  20.1  0  178 
R&D firm’s revenue in previous fiscal year ($ millions)  17.6  44.9  0  523.2 
R&D firm’s net income in previous fiscal year ($ millions)  -14.4  29.1  -351.9  44.3 
R&D firm’s cash and equivalents at end of previous year ($ millions)  46.1  134.2  0  1452.4 
“Cash burn rate” of R&D firm (years)  3.2  17.6  0  295.5 
Does agreement assign …         
… any termination rights?  97.7%    0  1 
… any termination rights to financing firm?  96.7%    0  1 
… unconditional termination rights to financing firms?  38.9%    0  1 
… unconditional termination rights to financing firms that also trigger 
      broad access to the terminated project? 
11.3%   0  1 
 Table 2.  Cross-tabulation of the financing firm’s termination and broad licensing rights.  The sample consists of 
584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger 
biotechnology companies (“financing companies”).  The Table presents the mean number of specified termination and 
broad intellectual property rights of the financing company.  In Panel A, the observations are divided by whether the 
product was unspecifiable at the signing of the research agreement, whether the leading underwriter in the R&D firm’s 
initial public offering is above the median Carter-Manaster style rank, whether the agreement is between two 
biotechnology firms, whether the R&D firm has above the median net income in the year before the signing of the 
research agreement, whether the R&D firm has above the median cash and equivalents at the end of the year before the 
research agreement, and whether the product involves a diagnostic or veterinary application.  In Panel B, the 
observations are divided by whether the product was unspecifiable at the signing of the research agreement as well as 
other features of the research agreement.  p-Values from t-tests of the null hypothesis that these distributions are identical 
are reported in the final column. 
 
Panel A: Simple Comparisons of Termination and Broad Intellectual Property Rights 
  Mean number of unconditional termination
and broad intellectual property rights 
assigned to financing firm 
Yes No. p-Value
No specifiable lead product candidate at signing of research agreement?  0.20 0.12 0.039
Carter-Manaster rank of R&D firm’s IPO lead underwriter above median?  0.16 0.15 0.923
Agreement between two biotechnology firms?  0.26 0.13 0.009
R&D firm’s net income in previous year above median?  0.14 0.14 1.000
R&D firm’s cash and equivalents at end of previous year above median?  0.14 0.14 0.934
Does agreement involve diagnostic product?  0.05 0.16 0.047
Does agreement involve veterinary product?  0.03 0.15 0.139
Panel B: Cross-Tabulations of Termination and Broad Licensing Rights 
  Mean number of unconditional termination
and broad intellectual property rights 
assigned to financing firm 
  Yes No. p-Value
No specifiable lead product candidate at signing of research agreement? 
   If Carter-Manaster rank of R&D firm’s IPO lead underwriter above median 0.23 0.11 0.027
   If Carter-Manaster rank of R&D firm’s IPO lead underwriter below median 0.19 0.14 0.468
No specifiable lead product candidate at signing of research agreement? 
   If agreement is between two biotechnology firms  0.44 0.11 0.006
   If agreement is not between two biotechnology firms  0.14 0.12 0.590
No specifiable lead product candidate at signing of research agreement? 
   If R&D firm’s net income in previous year above median  0.17 0.12 0.398
   If R&D firm’s net income in previous year below median  0.22 0.11 0.068
No specifiable lead product candidate at signing of research agreement? 
   If R&D firm’s cash and equivalents at end of previous year above median  0.17 0.13 0.472
   If R&D firm’s cash and equivalents at end of previous year below median  0.21 0.10 0.043
 
 
 Table 3.  Regression analysis of the financing firm’s termination and broad licensing rights.  The sample consists of 584 research agreements entered into between 
biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing companies”).  The dependent variable is the number of specified 
termination and broad intellectual property rights of the financing company.  The independent variables in all regressions include the date of the research agreement, a 
dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product candidate at the signing of the research agreement, dummies for diagnostic or veterinary applications, and the 
Carter-Manaster style rank of the leading underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering.  In selected regressions, the independent variables also include the count 
of the R&D firm’s total patents at the time of the agreement, the absolute value of the ratio of cash flow over cash and equivalents of the R&D firm (“cash burn rate”) at 
the time of the agreement, the count of previous research agreements between the two firms, and dummy variables for the year of the research agreement (not reported).  
The first two and last two regressions employ an ordinary least squares specification; the third and fourth, an ordered logit specification.  Standard errors in brackets. 
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Year  fixed  effects No No No No Yes Yes
   Number of observations  530  480  530  480  530  480 
   χ
2-statistic or F-statistic  2.44 2.03 10.23 12.15 1.09 1.06
   R
2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. Table 4.  Regression analysis of the financing firm’s termination and broad intellectual property rights with pharmaceutical company fixed effects.  The sample 
consists of 584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing companies”).  
The dependent variable is the number of specified termination and broad intellectual property rights of the financing company.  The independent variables in all regressions 
include the date of the research agreement, a dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product candidates at the signing of the research agreement, dummies for diagnostic 
or veterinary applications, the Carter-Manaster style rank of the leading underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering and dummy variables for the financing companies 
(not reported).  In selected regressions, the independent variables also include the count of the R&D firm’s total patents at the time of the agreement, the absolute value of the 
ratio of cash flow over cash and equivalents of the R&D firm (“cash burn rate”) at the time of the agreement, the count of previous research agreements between the two firms, 
and dummy variables for the year of the research agreement (not reported).  All regressions employ an ordinary least squares specification.  Standard errors in brackets. 
 
  Dependent Variable:  
  Termination and Broad Intellectual Property Rights of 
Financing Firm 

















































Financing company fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
   Number of observations  530  480  530  480 
   F-statistic  1.30  1.28  1.04  1.03 
   R
2 0.04        0.06 0.07 0.09
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. Table 5.  Regression analysis of the financing firm’s termination and broad intellectual property rights, divided by proxies for R&D firm’s financial constraints.  The 
sample consists of 584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing 
companies”).  The dependent variable is the number of specified termination and broad intellectual property rights of the financing company.  The independent variables in all 
regressions include the date of the research agreement, a dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product candidate at the signing of the research agreement, dummies for 
diagnostic or veterinary applications, the Carter-Manaster [1990] style rank of the leading underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering, the count of the R&D firm’s total 
patents at the time of the agreement, the absolute value of the ratio of cash flow over cash and equivalents of the R&D firm (“cash burn rate”) at the time of the agreement, and the 
count of previous research agreements between the two firms.  In the first pair of regressions, observations are divided by whether the R&D firm has above or below the median 
net income (-$7.7 million); in the third and fourth, whether the R&D firm has above or below the median cash and equivalents ($12.7 million).  All employ an ordinary least 
squares specification.  Standard errors in brackets. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Termination and Broad Intellectual Property Rights of 
Financing Firm 
  Measured on Net Income    Measured on Cash and Equivalents 
  Below Median  Above Median   Below Median  Above Median 












   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































   Number of observations  247  233    235  245 
   F-statistic  1.36  1.09    2.08  1.14 
   R
2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. Table 6.  Regression analysis of the financing firm’s termination and broad intellectual property rights, divided by proxies for the type of financing firm.  The sample 
consists of 584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing companies”).  
The dependent variable is the number of specified termination and broad intellectual property rights of the financing company.  The independent variables in all regressions 
include the date of the research agreement, a dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product candidate at the signing of the research agreement, dummies for diagnostic 
or veterinary applications, and the Carter-Manaster [1990] style rank of the leading underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering (in the first pair of regressions only).  
Observations are divided by whether by whether the research agreement is between two biotechnology firms.  All employ an ordinary least squares specification.  Standard 
errors in brackets. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Termination and Broad IntellectualProperty Rights of 
Financing Firm 
  Divided by Whether Agreement is Between Two Biotechnology Firms 
    Yes No 
























   Number of observations  77   
   
   
453
   F-statistic  2.05 1.15
   R
2 0.13 0.01
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 
 Table 7.  Regression analysis of the financing firm’s termination and broad intellectual property 
rights, with interaction terms for firm profitability and the type of financing firm.  The sample 
consists of 584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and 
pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing companies”).  The dependent variable is the 
number of specified termination and broad intellectual property rights of the financing company.  The 
independent variables in all regressions include the date of the research agreement, a dummy for 
agreements with diagnostic or veterinary applications, the Carter-Manaster [1990] style rank of the leading 
underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering, the count of the R&D firm’s total patents at the time 
of the agreement, the absolute value of the ratio of cash flow over cash and equivalents of the R&D firm 
(“cash burn rate”) at the time of the agreement, and the count of previous research agreements between the 
two firms. The first regression also includes dummies for whether the firm is above or below the median 
net income in the fiscal year prior to the research agreement, and interactions between these dummies and a 
dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product candidate at the time of the research agreement. 
The second regression also includes dummies for whether the financing company is a biotechnology firm 
or a pharmaceutical company, and interactions between these dummies and a dummy for agreements 
without specifiable lead product candidate at the time of the research agreement.  All employ an ordinary 
least squares specification.  Standard errors in brackets. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Termination and 
Broad Intellectual Property Rights of 
Financing Firm 




   Interaction 




























Above median net income   -18.97 
[15.51] 
 
Below median net income  -19.10 
[15.54] 
 
Agreement between two biotechnology firms    -8.91 
[11.61] 
Agreement between a biotechnology and a pharmaceutical firm    -8.90 
[11.60] 
Above median net income and no specified lead product at signing  0.08 
[0.08] 
 
Below median net income and no specified lead product at signing  0.20 
[0.08]** 
 
Biotech-biotech agreement and no specified lead product at signing    0.31 
[0.11]*** 
Biotech-Pharma agreement and no specified lead product at signing    0.07 
[0.05] 
   Number of observations  480  480 
   F-statistic  6.88  7.21 
   R
2 0.14 0.14 
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. Table 8.  Regression analysis of the financing firm’s termination and broad intellectual property rights, divided by proxies for the R&D company 
quality.  The sample consists of 584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology 
companies (“financing companies”).  The dependent variable is the number of specified termination and broad intellectual property rights of the financing 
company.  The independent variables in all regressions include the date of the research agreement, a dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product 
candidate at the signing of the research agreement, dummies for diagnostic or veterinary applications, and the Carter-Manaster [1990] style rank of the leading 
underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering (in the first pair of regressions only).  Observations are divided by whether by whether the R&D firm has 
above or below the median Carter-Manaster rank of the lead underwriter (8.75).  All employ an ordinary least squares specification.  Standard errors in brackets. 
 
  Dep. Var.: Termination and Broad Intellectual Property Rights of Financing Firm 
  Divided by Underwriter Reputation 
  Above Median  Below Median 
























   Number of observations  307   
   
   
223
   F-statistic  2.87 0.44
   R
2 0.04 0.01
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 
 Table 9.  Regression analyses using alternative dependent variables.  The sample consists of 584 research agreements entered into between biotechnology 
firms (“R&D firms”) and pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology companies (“financing companies”).  The dependent variable in the first four regressions is the 
number of specified termination rights of the financing company.  The dependent variable in the fifth and sixth regressions is the number of specified provisions 
assigning termination and broad intellectual property rights to the financing company only in well-defined circumstances (“conditional termination and licensing 
rights”).  The independent variables in all regressions include the date of the research agreement, a dummy for agreements without specifiable lead product 
candidate at the signing of the research agreement, dummies for diagnostic or veterinary applications, and the Carter-Manaster style rank of the leading 
underwriter in the R&D firm’s initial public offering.  In selected regressions, the independent variables also include the count of the R&D firm’s total patents at 
the time of the  agreement, the absolute value of the ratio of cash flow over cash and equivalents of the R&D firm (“cash burn rate”) at the time of the agreement, 
and the count of previous research agreements between the two firms.  The first two regressions employ an ordinary least squares specification; the third and 
fourth, an ordered logit specification.  Standard errors in brackets. 
 
                                       Dependent Variable: 
     Conditional Termination 
  Termination Rights of Financing Firm    and Broad Property 
Rights 




















   
   
   
   
     
     
       
      
           





































































   Number of observations  530  480  530  480    530  480 
   χ
2-statistic or F-statistic  2.96 1.53 15.76 13.70  1.57 0.96
   R
2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 
 